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Abstract
Information security becomes an inseparable part of our everyday life. An encryption
method widely used today is public-key encryption. The security of this method is based on
a hard to solve mathematical problems against an adversary with limited computational
power. Such an assumption could be broken as our understanding of the mathematics
being improved or new computation tools being developed. One such tool that poses a
threat to the public key encryption is a quantum computer. As a result, a new encryption
method with a new security assumption is required.
Quantum key distribution is a point-to-point symmetric key distribution method with
security based on the law of physics. In theory, the key generated by QKD is information-
theoretic secured. However, in practice, physical devices could have flaws or possess some
behaviors deviated from the theoretical model. These imperfections could open security
loopholes for an adversary to exploit, compromising the security. Thus the security ver-
ification and system characterization of practical implementation of QKD are necessary.
The necessity of this verification is further emphasized as several QKD systems are being
commercialized and used in several discrete communication links today.
To extend this new encryption system’s practical implementation on a wider network
scale requires a set of standards or common practices for developers and service providers
to follow. This set of rules is set to ensure the compatibility of different device models in
the network and ensure the security of each component in the system, which would affect
the security of the system as a whole.
To fulfill standardization and certification criteria, a record of best practice on security
analysis, system design, device characterization, and security verification of QKD imple-
mentation is required. The research projects throughout my Ph.D. study contribute toward
this practice. These studies also address some issues and provide possible solutions to the
development of a standard for QKD. This thesis is a collection of six experimental studies
on performance evaluation and security verification of different components of practical
quantum key distribution systems.
The first study is a comparison between the performance of the QKD system with
quantum dot (QD) as a single-photon source and the performance of QKD with weak-
coherent pulsed (WCP) source. The result shows that the QKD with QD could generate
the key at higher channel loss than WCP QKD using the same laser source. This result
shows the potential of QKD with a single-photon source as a candidate for secret key
distribution over high channel loss, such as up-link satellite-based QKD.
iv
The second study is a theoretical study on the method to characterize the QKD system
against the Trojan-horse attack being considered as a standard for the QKD system. The
result shows a possible loophole of this method against a more powerful adversary than
assumed in the previously proposed model. An improved version of characterization against
a more general form of Trojan-horse attack has been proposed.
The third experiment is on the information leakage from a free-space QKD receiver due
to detector backflash, a photon produced by the detector upon detection. The result shows
that the backflash photons carry the information of the ’clicked’ detector that could be
transmitted back to the channel and discriminated by Eve. An experimental demonstration
of this attack has been performed. Countermeasure both in theory and practical setup has
been proposed.
The next experiment is on the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial-mode
detection efficiency mismatch attack on the free-space QKD system. We show that, by
using a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and hologram created by Zernike poly-
nomials, atmospheric turbulence with various strength covered from sea level to upper
atmosphere can be experimentally emulated in the lab environment. We then use that
setup to show the limit of the distance that Eve’s attack is successful. The theoretical
limit of the attack distance also shown.
In the fifth study, we use the SLM and Zernike polynomial holograms to characterize a
free-space QKD system against spatial mode attack. The result shows that, with higher-
order spatial modes and finer control of wavefront intensity distribution, Eve could bypass
the countermeasure proposed in our previous study. We proposed a more robust version
of countermeasure against spatial mode attack. The new countermeasure is verified by the
SLM setup.
The last study is on the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor (TES). The
result shows that TES’s voltage response can be deterministically controlled by Eve using
bright laser through the input channel. It also shows that the photon number result from
TES can be controlled by Eve. An attack model exploiting this imperfection has been
shown.
In addition to the contribution to the standardization of the QKD system, I hope that
the result of this thesis would emphasize the necessity of security verification of the QKD
system and the verification of countermeasure and characterization method against more
general attack model. Although the unconditional security, promised in theory, could not
yet be achieved, this loop of hacking and patching should provide us information and insight
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4.1 Experimental setup. For the WCP QKD experiment, the photon pulses are
sent directly from Ti:Sapphire laser to the QKD setup. For q. dot QKD, the
quantum dot is excited with the pulsed laser from Ti:Sapphire laser. A grat-
ing and a wedge mirror are used to separate exciton pulses from bi-exciton
pulses. The photons then sent to the QKD system under test. In Alice, the
polarization state is selected by a PBS and a half-wave plate HWP mounted
on a rotational stage. For each set of data collection, the polarization is
fixed to one of the four linear polarization orientation, horizontal (H), ver-
tical (V), diagonal (D), and anti-diagonal (A). The key generation rate is
an average of these four polarization settings. In a real implementation, the
state preparation could be done using one of the following setup. The first
is to use a fiber-based polarization modulator, which has a typical insertion
loss of 4dB and a repetition rate of 1GHz [1]. Another option is to passively
coupling together four QDs with dedicated polarization orientation. The
state can be selected by sending an excitation laser pulse to respective QD
for intended polarization in each time slot. This setup could reach the GHz
level repetition rate. A set of attenuator Att is used to select signal and
decoy intensity in the weak-coherent pulse (WCP) experiment, as well as
simulate channel loss. For the resonance excitation experiment, the source
is replaced with the lower setup where notch filter N and a single-mode
fiber-coupled band-pass filter F are used to separate reflected laser from
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4.2 Spectrum of the QD emission excited at 830 nm, above band-gap non-
resonant excitation (NRE) scheme. The spectrum shows three peaks at-
tributed to the exciton (X), biexciton (XX), and charged exciton or trion
(T ). The spectrum was taken by an imaging spectrometer using a 1200
grooves/mm grating. Photo shows nanowirestructure of the QD under study. 28
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The word cryptography (derived from the Greek words ‘cryptos’ means hidden or secret,
and ‘graphei’ means write) is a study of methods to secure the communication between
legitimate parties –often called Alice and Bob– against an adversary –often called eaves-
dropper or Eve. As secure communication becomes an inseparable part of our daily life, the
importance of the development of cryptosystems and the understanding of its counterpart,
cryptanalytic, the study of analyzing ciphertext and decipher the encrypted data by the
third party is undeniable.
Modern cryptography assumes that an adversary is familiar with all the devices used
in the cryptosystem and has full knowledge of the protocol – the processes used to gen-
erate and distribute the key. This assumption is also known as Kerckhoffs’s principle
[68]. Eve also knows all the possible messages and ciphertext that might be sent. To-
day’s secure communication protocols often rely on “presumably” hard-to-solve mathe-
matical problems. For instance, the ubiquitous public key distribution protocol known
as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman protocol (RSA) [132] utilizes the multiplication of two large
prime numbers to exchange the secret key between two parties. The security of this pro-
tocol, which prevents fast decryption, is based on the assumption that it is incredibly
difficult, for today’s computer to solve using the best-known algorithm within the lifetime
of the encrypted message, to find the two large prime numbers (factorization) given the
multiplication result. However, this scheme may fail if solutions to relevant mathematical
problems arise, either via a faster decryption algorithm or via new technologies and tools
that offer new ways to solve problems. The encryption method relied on the assumption
of hard-to-solve problems are often called classical cryptography.
An emerging quantum technology that can potentially solve many hard mathematical
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problems is a scalable quantum computer. Peter Shor has shown theoretically that, if
a scalable quantum computer can be built, it can crack the factorization problem expo-
nentially faster than today’s best classical computer [146]. To ensure secure transmission
protocols in the quantum era, the field of Quantum-safe Cryptography emerged.
Quantum-safe cryptography is a collective term for the study of cryptographic tools that
are safe against the computation power of quantum computers and quantum algorithms.
There are two main approaches to achieve this new security level, namely post-quantum
cryptography and quantum cryptography.
Post-quantum cryptography (the name means classical cryptography after quantum
computer emerged) focused on finding new protocols mathematical problems that are
hard-to-solve for quantum computers and known quantum algorithms. This approach
has an advantage that the protocols are relatively easy to implement without retooling
existing classical communication infrastructure. However, their reliance on the hard-to-
solve problem could not guarantee long term security. As new technology emerged and our
understanding of the quantum algorithm developed.
Quantum cryptography (the name means cryptography based on the law of quantum
mechanics), on the other hand, is a study of secure communication where its security
based on the law of physics and mathematical proof, which is almost impossible to defy
or break. One of the most well-studied topics in this field is Quantum key distribution
(QKD), which focuses on secure generation and distribution of symmetric secret key–a
secret identical random bit string between parties.
QKD has been developed rapidly over the past decades. It is one of the quantum tech-
nology that has reached the point of practical use and commercialization. To guarantee
security across various devices models and platform, several drafts of international stan-
dardization and certification of a practical QKD system is being developed and proposed
by various organizations around the world. Toward that goal of standardized security of
QKD implementation, it is essential to include the latest understanding from theoretical
security analysis, as well as best practices from a practical implementation point of view.
This thesis is a record of a series of experiments and security verification on QKD
systems throughout my Ph.D. study. This thesis is structured in a hope to provide the
readers a broad scope of QKD system development, from the practical implementation
point of view, from comparing advantages and disadvantages of different choices of QKD
protocols, to improvement device characterization methods, to series of security verification
of QKD system. These records could be used in the standardization documents on the
practical implementation of QKD being developed. Lastly, we will discuss a practice and
criteria introduced for security auditing, where the physical implementation of the QKD
2
systems that have passed the security statement and standardization certification criteria
being scrutinized for possible leftover loopholes and vulnerabilities.
The content of this thesis is divided as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the secu-
rity of secure communication from the formal definition of secure communication to the
security proof of QKD protocols. The following chapters are a record of experiments on
QKD systems that provide insight on the development of the QKD system, from protocol’s
performance evaluation to developing and improvement of QKD devices characterization
method, to security verification of QKD systems. Chapter III present a study of the Quan-
tum dots (QD) as a single-photon source and its performance compared with conventional
weak coherent pulsed QKD protocol. Chapter IV is a study on a standardization pro-
posal for device characterization as a countermeasure against the Trojan horse attack. We
propose an improvement of the characterization procedure to take into account a more
powerful variant of the attack, which was not included in the original proposal.
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Chapter 2
Security of secret communication
This chapter will provide a formal definition, framework and tools to understanding the
security of QKD. In this scenario the two legitimate parties Alice and Bob would like to
communicate secretly, while Eve would like to eavesdrop the conversation.
2.1 Security of cryptosystem
The security of a cryptosystem is defined as follows 1
LetM be a set of all possible messages, C is a set of all possible cryptogram or encrypted
messages which might be transmitted through the public channel. A cryptosystem is
perfectly secure if
p(M) = p(M |C) ∀M ∈M and ∀C ∈ C (2.1)
where p(M) is a priori probability distribution of message and p(M |C) is a posterioi prob-
ability distribution of the message as viewed by Eve after learning about C.
In other words, Eve does not gain additional information about the message from the
cryptogram. This secure communication can be achieved with an encryption scheme called
one-time pad. [145]
The one-time pad is a scheme in which two parties – often called Alice and Bob –
encrypt and decrypt the message using a shared secret key. Without loss of generality, the
set of messagesM can be defined as a binary string of length m,M = {0, 1}⊕m and the set
1The following contents in this section are summarized from [105, 11, 89].
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of all possible keys K = {0, 1}⊕m where the key K was picked randomly with probability
p(K) = 1
2m
. The one-time-pad scheme works as follows:
Alice and Bob exchange the key K beforehand, in secret.
Alice obtains the encrypted message C by the message by performing bit-wise XOR
between message M and key K,
C = M ⊕K. (2.2)
The encrypted message is sent to Bob via a public channel where Eve can take a copy of it.
After receiving C, Bob applies a bit-wise XOR between his key and the encrypted message
C. If there is no error in the channel, Bob will get
MBob = K ⊕ C = K ⊕K ⊕M = M. (2.3)
From here, it can be easily shown that for any message M,M ′ ∈ K and key K ∈ K
such that M ⊕ K = C there exist K ′ = M ′ ⊕ M ⊕ K ∈ K such that M ′ ⊕ K ′ = C.
This means that by learning, C, Eve’s chance to ‘guess’ the right message, M, is equal
to the probability that the key K would be selected. In other words, the security of the
cryptosystem is as high as the security of the key itself.
This key distribution and sending an encrypted message over an untrusted channel
has an advantage over a secure direct communication method. It allows the protocol to
abort in the middle of the key exchange without leaking any critical information about
the message. Both parties can stop and restart their protocol as much time as necessary
until they are certain that they got a secure key. The next challenge is since modern
cryptography needs to support long-range communication while providing the ability to
detect malicious activities in the channel and abort the protocol. For that, many schemes
and protocols for ‘Key Distribution’ have been developed.
2.2 BB84 protocol
The first QKD protocol being introduced is Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. It
was named after C. Bennett and G. Brassard [13] who introduced this protocol in 1984.
This protocol is the first successfully implemented QKD protocol and still being studied
and developed until today [13, 36, 86, 51]. The definition of the protocol is as followed.
Quantum phase
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 (Signal preparation and transmission) Alice prepare series of qubit state, each bit
is picked randomly from one of the four states |0〉 , |1〉 in X basis , or its linear
combination |+〉 = |0〉 + |1〉, |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉 in Z basis. Alice records the bit value
and sends the state to Bob.
 (Measurement) For each time slot, Bob locally picks, at random, one of the two
bases of measurement, (0, 1) or (+,−), he performs the measurement, record the
measurement result and the basis he chose in each bit.
Classical phase
 (Parameter estimation) Alice an Bob randomly choose a small portion of their data
as a test set to evaluate the statistical variables in their data. For example, they
might disclose some detection results to compare the distribution of detection across
each detector in Bob and the value that Alice sent. From there, they design whether
a key can be generated from the remaining data. If not, they abort the protocol.
Other variables, such as error rate, can be used further in the post-processing step.
 (Sifting) Via a classical authenticated channel, Bob sends the index of slots that he
detected signal and their corresponding measurement basis. Alice keeps only the
slots in which the basis of measurement match her preparation, and discard the rest.
Then, he sends the index of those keeping slots to Bob. Bob discard all other slots.
 (Keymap) They map each remaining slot into a respective binary bit. For example,
|0〉 and |+〉 to bit 0 and |1〉 and |−〉 to bit 1. The bit string obtained from this step
is called the sifted key.
 (Error correction) Alice and Bob execute an error correction algorithm to correct any
error in their raw key. If the error rate exceeds a certain threshold of Q, terminate
the protocol.
 (Privacy Amplification) Alice and Bob apply a 2-universal hash function on their
remaining bit string to eliminate Eve’s information about the secret key. The di-
mension of the hash function is determined by Eve’s information estimated during
parameter estimation and error correction step. The bit string as a result of this step
is the secret key.
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In general, any quantum states which contain two non-orthogonal bases can be used
for QKD. In practical implementation, however, the quantum state of photons such as
polarization or phase are prime candidates for the task. This is due to its long coherence
time as well as the ease of manipulation and transmission.
One of the obvious examples for the security of QKD is the ability to detect a man in
the middle or intercept and resend attack. In this attack, Eve measures each pulse from
Alice, then generates and sends Bob a state according to her measurement result. Without
information about the choice of basis from Alice, the only strategy available to Eve is to
pick a basis of measurement at random. This attack has a 50% chance that her choice of
basis does not match that of Bob. These wrong basis choices could induce as high as 25%
bit error rate in Bob. Alice and Bob could detect this during parameter estimation and
error correction steps and terminate the protocol. With more rigorous analysis, it can be
shown that QKD is secure against any attack allowed by the law of physics.
2.2.1 Security analysis and key rate equation
In this section, we provide an overview of the security of the BB84 QKD protocol from the
theoretical perspective. With limited time, detection, and transmission efficiency, only a
finite amount of quantum bit can be exchanged during each quantum phase. As a result,
there are some statistical deviation and failure probability that needed to be taken into
account. This finite size effect occurred from the fact that a small sample taken from a
finite population might not contain the same statistical properties as the population as a
whole. Take this into account, R. Renner [129] has given a general definition of secure key:
Definition 2.2.1 A QKD protocol is called ε-secure, if after the execution of the protocol,
there exists a density matrix ρE so that the following inequality holds.
1
2
∥∥ρABE − ρidealABE∥∥ < ε (2.4)






p(k, k′) |K〉 〈K| ⊗ |K ′〉 〈K ′| ⊗ ρ(K,K
′)
E (2.5)
where |K〉 and |K ′〉 2 be a state that represents the possible classical key shared by Alice
and Bob, respectively, at the end of the protocol, ρ
(K,K′)
E is the quantum state hold by Eve
2More detail about Dirac notations and density matrix can be seen in [62, 105].
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|K〉 〈K| ⊗ ρE (2.6)
is the ideal overall state at the end of an ideal protocol where Eve’s quantum state is
independent of the states in Alice and Bob’s hand.
The ref. [129, 70, 139] provide a core theorem for the privacy amplification.
1
2
∥∥ρABE − ρidealABE∥∥ < 2− 12 (Hmin(A|E)−l) < εPA (2.7)
for some εPA > 0 where Hmin(A|E) is the minimal entropy of state A for the states known
by Eve E. l is the length of the key after privacy amplification. Hence, the key rate for



















where q is the sifting factor, n is sifted key size, usually 1/2 for a symmetric basis choice.
S(A|E) is the conditional Holevo quality of each quantum signal share by Alice and Bob as
seen by Eve. The last two terms are finite-size correction terms for privacy amplification
failure probability, and for using smooth-min entropy and Holevo quantity as an estimation
for Eve’s information. The term leakEC = h(e) − log
√
3 log (2/εEC)/n is a portion of
information disclosed during the error correction step. The last term is a correction term
for error correction’s failure probability due to the finite size effect.
From [50, 33], for BB84 protocol, the therm S(A|E) is bounded by 1-h(e) where h(e) =
−e log e− (1−e) log (1− e), and e is observed error rate between Alice and Bob. Together,
the key rate equation for BB84 protocol under finite size effect can be written as
l
N
≥ q(1− h(e))− fh(e)− log
√








where f > 1 is the error correction inefficiency. It can be seen that as n → 0 we have an
asymptotic key rate for BB84 with ideal error correction code l/N = 1/2(1-2h(e)).
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2.3 BB84 protocol with imperfect source
One of widely used photon source for quantum optics experiment is laser. Ideally, light
pulse emitted from laser source is in a coherent state. A coherent state |α〉 is defined
as an eigenstate of the annihilation operator â. The coherent state can be written as a

















, which is a Poissonian distribution with mean photon number µ = |α|2. As
mean photon number and pulses intensity are proportional to each other for laser source,
we may use these terms interchangeably later on.
2.3.1 Multi-photon pulses and PNS attack
From Eq. (2.10), if a laser source is attenuated such that the mean photon number µ < 1, a
majority of the non-empty pulse will be single-photon pulses. This so-called Weak coherent
pulsed laser (WCP) source is widely used in various quantum optics studies, including
QKD. This source has a non-zero chance of producing multi-photon pulses. If it was used
in the QKD system, it would allow Eve to perform an attack on the QKD system, namely
Photon number splitting attack (PNS) attack. Eve’s attack strategy on a QKD system
with a chance of multi-photon pulses is as followed.
(Quantum phase) Alice and Bob’s quantum channel is replaced by a lossless channel.
For each incoming pulse from Alice, Eve determines the photon number using quantum
non-demolition (QND) measurement, which does not disturb the quantum state. For each
multi-photon pulse, Eve keeps one photon in her quantum memory and passes the rest
to Bob. For single-photon pulses, she takes advantage of her lossless channel by blocking
some of the pulses to maintain Bob’s total detection rate. If the single-photon emission
rate cannot keep up with original Alice and Bob’s line loss, she blocks some multi-photon
pulses to maintain the detection rate.
(Classical phase) Eve listens to Alice and Bob’s communication in the classical chan-
nel and measure photons in her memory using the correct basis announced by Alice and
Bob.
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With this strategy, if the probability of multi-photon pulse is too high so that Eve able
to block all single-photon pulses, Eve will gain full information about the key. Otherwise,
Eve still gains higher information about the key than estimated in the ideal situation
analyzed in the previous section.
To make this attack into account and continue using the WCP source, the post-
processing and key rate equation of Alice and Bob needed to be modified. By characterizing
the source, the probability of getting a multi-photon pulse, Pmulti can be determined. Alice
and Bob need to assume the worst case where Eve gains full information about every multi-
photon pulse sent by Alice. Furthermore, they can estimate the detection rate, Pdet of the
signal by characterizing Bob’s receiver, and the channel condition without Eve present.
From that, Alice and Bob can rule out Eve’s information on their key. In addition, Alice
and Bob need to assume that the bits that Eve gained information of were detected by
Bob, passed all post-processing, and be part of the final key. Let A = (Pdet − Pmulti)/Pdet









By characterizing their devices and find the value of A, Alice and Bob can generate a
key using a weak coherent source. This analysis not only applied to WCP source, but it
also works for other types of photon source that has a probability of emitting multi-photon
pulses. The task for Alice and Bob is to characterize the source and find the multi-photon
probability.
2.3.2 Decoy-state protocol
The disadvantage of the multi-photon portion subtraction method is that the key exchange
at a longer distance (higher loss) is viable only if the source has a lower multi-photon
probability. For the WCP source, the pulse intensity has to be lowered. That, in turn,
reduces the secret key size per session. To improve the performance of the QKD system,
a new QKD protocol with WCP source has been introduced; Decoy-state protocol. The
protocol definition of a decoy-state QKD is similar to the BB84 protocol, with the following
changes in some steps.
Quantum phase
 (Signal preparation) In addition to choosing a bit value and basis, Alice also selects
an intensity at random from a predetermined set of signal intensity µ and any number
of decoy intensities νi < µ.
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Classical phase
 (Parameter estimation) Alice can announce the intensity setting for each pulse so
that both she and Bob have a set of detection probability and error rates for each
intensity setting. From here, they can either abort the protocol if those variables
deviated from the expected value, or continue the key distillation out of the set of
detection from the signal state.
If Eve performs PNS attack on each pulse from Alice and captures one photon from
each multi-photon pulse, the photon statistics in each set of intensity would change. Since
each photon pulse contains a certain number of photons and no information about intensity
setting, Eve cannot determine each pulse’s intensity setting only by measuring the photon
number individually.
Following the BB84 approach discussed in the previous section, we have the key rate
for decoy state protocol after privacy amplification [95, 86, 28]:
l
n
= q(−Qµf(e)h(eµ) +Q1(1− h(e1)))−∆ (2.12)
where q = 1/2 is sifting factor, µ is signal state intensity, Qmu is the gain of detection
for the signal state, Q1 is the gain of single-photon state. f(e)¿1 is the inefficiency of
error correction. ∆ is a finite size correction. Since these protocols perform parameter
estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification like the BB84 protocol, all ∆ terms
from that analysis also apply here.
The goal of this analysis is to write a bound of the key rate as a function of observables
for Alice and Bob. First, let Yi be the yield of the i-photon state i.e., condition probability of
detection in Bob given i-photon pulse is sent from Alice. Y0 is background count (including





given Alice’s source is WCP. Furthermore, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for i-photon






where ed is probability of a photon hitting error detector (caused by device imperfection),








e−µ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ. (2.15)








If Alice and Bob have an infinite number of decoy states and infinite lengths of the
key for characterization, they could calculate the value of gain and error rate precisely for
each state. In practice, however, Alice and Bob could set only a limited set of decoy and
a limited number of key exchange. By substitute Eq. (2.14) to the key rate equation, the
problem is simplified to finding the bound of e1, Y1, and Y0. Here we consider the one decoy
case where Alice set one level of decoy ν and one level of signal µ > ν







µ − Y0 − Y1µ, (2.17)








≤ Y1ν + ν2/µ2(Qmu− Y0 − Y1µ)
(2.18)
Here, we use the fact that ai ≤ a2 for all a < 1 and i > 2, along with Eq. (2.17). Solving
this equation we have lower bound of Y1












Since Alice and Bob have no way to calculate Y0 in this scenario, they need to assume
the worst-case and let Eve puck Y0 for them. For Eve, it benefits her most if she picks
Y0 to be 0 since she wants to minimize noise detection in Bob and gain more information
from non-empty detection. Thus the lower bound of Y1 as a function of observables for
Alice and Bob is















Substitute these to the key rate equation; we have the key rate bound as a function
of observables. Alice and Bob have a limited amount of exchange signals, and they need
to limit the amount of decoy-state portion of the key to maximizing their secure key rate.
The statistical deviation of Qµ, Qν , Eµ,, and Eν is unavoidable. From the analysis in [28],














where Nµ/Nν is the number of signal/decoy sent by Alice, respectively. u is the number
of standard deviation from the central value. The lower acceptable probability of failure is
required in the protocol; the higher u need to be. The factor of 2 in the last two equations
is from the sifting ratio.
So far, we have discussed the theoretical aspect of QKD. These are important tools for
the analyses and experiments in various QKD systems in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3
Practical implementation of QKD
The theoretical analysis of QKD shows a high level of security, unachievable by its classical
counterpart. Although quantum cryptography’s security criteria shifted from computa-
tional difficulty in classical communication to the physical property of light, one condition
remains; the security of the whole cryptography system is as weak as the weakest link.
Since the security assumption of QKD relies on the law of physics, it is unavoidable that
the security of QKD is also dictated by its physical implementation. Any imperfections
in the physical implementation, any deviation from the model in security proof of a QKD
scheme can lead to side-channels that could be exploited by an eavesdropper (Eve) and
compromise security. The QKD protocol discussed so far is secured if the following as-
sumption holds:
1. Eve can listen to the classical channel, but she cannot tamper the message
transmitted through this classical channel This can be achieved by classical (or post-
quantum) authentication protocols [25, 115, 2]. This assumption means that Alice and
Bob need to share a secret bit for the first round of key distribution. Assuming that the
authentication is strong enough that an adversary cannot crack the authentication key
before the first quantum key distribution session is finished, a small portion of the newly
generated secret key during the session can be used for authentication for the next round.
As a result, a QKD system can turn a short-length, short-live to be an infinitely long secure
key, given enough time.
2. Eve is physically isolated from Alice’s and Bob’s devices This isolation
included all key generating and measurement devices, computation tools, as well as their
data storage. This assumption, along with no-cloning theorem [117, 168], stated that
Eve could not faithfully copy and store information of the quantum stage through the
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quantum channel without communicating with Alice, provides forward security for the
key generated by QKD. If Eve does not have a technology or method to interfere with
and learn about the quantum state (without being noticed) during the key exchange, Eve
cannot store the quantum state and retroactively measure the exchanged quantum state
when the technology allows in the future. Thus, the key remains secure. In practice,
however, this assumption can be broken by a so-called side-channel attack. The discussion
about these side channels and respective countermeasures shall be discussed in the next
chapters.
3. Alice’s and Bob’s physical devices behave as modeled In theory, this is handle
by assumptions in security proof. This assumption might include device characterization
and countermeasures against known attacks. In practice, Alice and Bob should study of
devices’ characteristics both within expected working parameters and outside their normal
working regime. This is because Eve’s side channel could alter the properties of the devices,
opening a loophole for an attack.
In this chapter, we will discuss the practical implementation of the QKD system, from
the requirements of important components to possible vulnerabilities caused by devia-
tion from the theoretical model and imperfection of the devices. We will then discuss
some examples of possible side-channel attacks exploiting those vulnerabilities and possi-
ble countermeasures.
3.1 QKD devices
This section is a brief discussion of some key physical devices that could fulfill the important
part of the QKD model.
3.1.1 Photon sources
A QKD system encodes and distributes the key via the quantum state of the photon. The
first key component for the QKD system we will discuss is the photon source.
Ideal single-photon source
The security of the QKD system relies on the fact that the state of a single photon cannot
be reliably duplicated by a third party without additional communication. This is known
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as no-cloning theorem [117, 168]. Most security models of QKD start from the encryption
of single-photon pulses. An ideal single-photon source, as the name suggested, is a device
that generates one photon in each time slot. So far, this ideal device has yet to be realized.
Weak coherent pulsed source
As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, the coherent state is an eigenstate of the annihilation
operator. This state can be generated by laser pulses attenuated such that the mean
photon number of a pulsed laser in each time slot is less than 1. Since photon number
distribution of pulsed laser (or coherent state) follows Poissonian distribution, most of the
non-empty emission will be single-photon pulsed. The multi-photon part of the source can
be handled by characterizing the source and subtract the appropriate amount of raw key
in the privacy amplification step or employing decoy-state protocol. This weak coherent
pulsed source (WCP) is widely used in many QKD systems [141, 86, 148, 3, 15, 81, 123].
Sub-Poissonian photon source
As our understanding of material science and quantum optics developed, many near-ideal
single-photon sources have been introduced. A well-known source is the heralding single-
photon source. By sending a bright laser through some non-linear crystal, such as beta
barium borate (BBO), a pair of entangled photons can be generated by a parametric down-
conversion process and transmitted at a certain angle [45]. If a photon is detected in an
angle from the incident beam path, it confirms the presence of a single-photon pulse in
the opposite angle. Although the probability of generating multiple photons from this
photon source can be drastically lower than the WCP source, the probability of generating
entangle photons per incident pulse is also low. This probabilistic emission can be overcome
by using quantum memory to store the state of photons before the key exchange. This
state can be read out to fill each time slot of the key exchange.
Another interesting sub-Poissonian photon source is the quantum dot (QD) [106, 108]
[71, 34, 170]. Quantum dot is three-dimensional confinement that traps an electron-hole
pair in two distinct electronic states. The electron can be excited by a laser pulse with
appropriate energy (wavelength) and emits an entangled photon pair in a deterministic
path. Since the quantum dot has near-unity quantum efficiency at low temperatures, it
can generate single-photon pulses with a high repetition rate and single-photon quality.
In principle, these parameters are only limited by the photon collection apparatus. The
properties and performance of QD as a single-photon source for QKD shall be discussed
in Chapter 4.
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3.1.2 Optical mode and state-encoding devices
In a QKD system, the information is encoded and carried by the optical mode of photons.
An optical mode is an orthonormal basis solution of Maxwell’s equation in classical electro-
dynamics. Linear optical devices can be used to manipulate optical modes. The following
are some examples of optical modes used in QKD encryption.
Polarization
The polarization of a photon refers to the vibrational plane of the electric field of that
photon [53, 100]. A BB84 state can be encoded in horizontal-vertical (H-V) linearly polar-
ized basis or its linear combinations in the diagonal (D-A) basis or left-right (L-R) circular
basis. These modes can be manipulated by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), which lets
only specific linear polarization to a certain path, and a combination of half-wave plate
and quarter-wave plate which transform a known input polarization photon to another
polarization depend on the orientation of their optical axes.
Phase
The phase of the electromagnetic field of a photon can be shifted by a phase shifter devices.
These devices can be a delay line that changes the optical path’s length or some material
that changes its reflective index based on an applied voltage [100]. Some of the examples
of QKD using phase encoding are described in [30, 3, 153, 154]
Time-bin
The time of arrival of photon pulses can be used to encode the BB84 states. By dividing
each time slot into ’early’ and ’late’ sub-slot using optical such as Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer in both sender and receiver, constructive interference between the pulses in two
adjacent time slots can be used to determine the path each pulse takes and assign respective
bit value for the key [156, 101, 66].
3.1.3 Quantum channel
Quantum channel is part of the QKD model that separates Alice and Bob, where the
quantum state is sent through. In general, this channel is assumed to be controlled by
Eve. In practice, there are two types of channels:
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Fiber optics
Fiber optics is a device that guides photons from one end to another, using the total
reflection phenomenon of a photon passing through two mediums with a different refractive
index [100]. It is widely used in classical optical communication. The advantage of this
channel is the ease of deployment. The disadvantage is the relatively high photon loss.
Since this loss cannot be overcome by amplifying the signal strength as usually done in
classical optics, this limits the distance of communication between two parties [153, 150,
83]. Furthermore, without specialized fiber optics [113], this type of channel suffers high
distortion in polarization state while able to maintain phase information at long distances.
Thus, phase encoding is widely used through the single-mode fiber optics channel [141,
118, 3].
Free-space channel
Free-space QKD sends the quantum states through vacuum or air. This type of channel
suffers relatively lower channel loss compares to that of fiber-optics. Thus, this channel
could cover a longer distance [143, 171, 84, 119]. This channel enables a platform that
could extend the QKD coverage to the global scale, the satellite-based QKD [15, 81, 123].
The downside of this channel is the requirement of a line of sight between Alice and Bob. A
long-distance ground-based, however, free-space QKD suffers from Earth’s geography and
curvature. It also suffers by phase and wavefront distortion due to atmospheric turbulence.
The atmospheric turbulence model and its effect on the free-space QKD system, including
Eve, shall be discussed in the respective experiment in Chapter 6.
3.1.4 State discrimination and detection devices
The general concept of the QKD receiver is to send distinct states into distinct paths inside
the receiver and detect by a detector at the end of the path. The state discrimination
apparatus in the receiver usually follows the same concept as the encoding device. A set
of wave plates and PBS can be used to discriminate against the polarization state. On the
other hand, the interferometer and phase shifter can be used to discriminate phase and
time-bin encoding. From there, the photon signals are sent to the detector. These detectors
have to be sensitive to the single-photon signal [52]. There are many types and models of
photon detectors used in the QKD system. They can be separate into two categories:
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Threshold detector or bucket detector
The threshold detector is one of the most commonly used in QKD due to ease of imple-
mentation and maintenance. This type of detector transforms a non-empty optical signal
pulse into an electronic pulse or ’click’. There are several parameters used to determine
the performance of each detector [52]. For example, the probability of a photon sent to the
detector ended up being registered as clicked is called ’detection efficiency’. The higher
efficiency, the better. On the other hand, the probability that the detector ’click’ without
photon sent is called ’darkcount’. A darkcount could be caused by a short circuit or tem-
perature fluctuation in the device. This darkcount could cause an error in the detection.
Thus, an ideal detector has to have this parameter as low as possible. This signal does
not contain information on photon energy or photon number. Other parameters, such
as wavelength-dependent efficiency, also needed to be considered. The examples of these
detectors are:
Photon multiplier tube (PMT) This device uses a series of cathode plates with
incrementally stronger biased voltage to multiply single electron scattered from a photo-
electric medium to be a measurable electronic pulse [59]. This type of detector is widely
used for its larger sensitive area and relatively low dark count rate [52].
Avalanche photo diode (APD) this device operated by reverse biasing the pho-
todiode such that a trigger by single-photon could induce a measurable pulse of current
through the diode [20]. This type of detector has a high detection rate and could detect
photons in several bands of wavelength depend on the detector’s materials [52].
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) This detector de-
tects the change in resistivity of superconducting material when hit by a photon [134, 69].
SNSPD has high detection efficiency and relatively low darkcount [52].
Photon-number resolving detector
In contrast to the bucket detector, the electrical signal photon number resolving detector
is proportional to the photon energy being detected. An example of this type of detector
is a Transition edge sensor (TES) [14, 35].
TES photon detector is a micro-calorimeter which consists of an absorber, a sensitive
thermometer, and a weak thermal link to a heat bath. The energy of photons absorbed
in the detector is measured through the change of resistance of the thermometer. TES
could achieved the highest detection efficiency among single-photon detector detectors up
to 95% for 1550-nm detection efficiency, with very low darkcount [82, 41, 107, 52]. The
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photon number resolving in other types of detector such as SNSPD or PMT has also been
studied [102, 162].
3.2 Attacks on QKD system
Cryptography is a game of cat-and-mouse between the legitimate parties and eavesdrop-
pers. To understand the extent of security that could be expected or claimed on a cryp-
tography system design, one needs to understand existing vulnerabilities in the system and
attack models that could exploit those vulnerabilities. In this section, we will discuss these
vulnerabilities and attacks.
3.2.1 Theoretical attack
Assuming the physical apparatus that could fulfill all requirements and conditions in the
theoretical model, the only possible opening in the system for Eve to attack is the quantum
state in the quantum channel. The strength of Eve’s attack can be divided into three
categories based on here ability to interact with the quantum signal.
Individual attack
In this attack, Eve uses the same strategy to probe each signal from Alice to Bob inde-
pendently throughout the key exchange step. For each state A’ from Alice, she attaches
her ancilla state, E. She then performs unitary operator on both A’ and E and passes A’
to Bob. She then stores E in quantum memory, and measure the state at the time of her
choosing to maximize the knowledge. She then follows the post-processing step of Alice
and Bob to gain some information about the secret key. An example of an individual
attack is the intercept-and-resend attack.
Collective attack
She probes each signal from Alice, similar to the individual attack. However, she listens
to Alice and Bob’s classical communication before designing the most optimal way to
collectively measure state E to maximize the information on the key.
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Coherent attack
This type of attack is the most general type of attack. Instead of interacting with each
signal individually, Eve interacts with all signals coherently, and attach one ancillary E to
all signals. She can measure her ancillary state E at any time to maximize information.
3.2.2 Side-channel attack
In reality, a practical device can behave differently from what is designed for or required
by the system. Some are intrinsic properties of the device, while some can be induced or
controlled by Eve. These flaws could open loop-hole for attacks on the system [160, 97,
125, 76, 93, 169, 44, 166, 67, 138, 135, 99, 136, 104, 137]. In addition to some attacks
discussed earlier in this thesis, we will discuss some examples of attacks made available by
physical implementation flaws.
Detector efficiency mismatch attack
One of the assumptions of a QKD receiver is that all the detectors have the same detection
efficiency. In practice, however, the detectors could possess a discrepancy in detection
efficiency under certain conditions, for example, in gated APD detector where the detectors
are activated (biased) only when the expected arrival time of the signal, there the gate
signal in each channel might not activate at an exact same time. If that occurs, in addition
to intercept and resend attack, Eve could selectively shift the arrival time of the signal to
the point that only the detector of her choice has a chance to detect the signal, reducing
the chance of her being detected. [125, 155]
Another form of detection efficiency mismatch attack is in the free-space QKD system
[138, 110]. In this attack, Eve alters the angle of arrival of the signal such that by the
internal reflection or imperfection of optical alignment in Bob, the photon beam misses all
unwanted detectors and detected only by the detector of her choice, masking her intercept-
and-resend attack. More detail of this attack shall be discussed in Chapter 6.
Wavelength-dependent attack
In practice, each detector or internal optical devices in Bob could have different sensitivity
to different wavelength [48, 57, 84, 149]. This flaw could allow Eve to manipulate the
detection results by changing the signal’s wavelength to Bob.
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Trojan horse attack
The security assumption of QKD states that the choice of state in Alice and the choice of
basis of measurement in Bob is not known to Eve. In practice, however, Eve could send
a bright laser pulse at the time of the state preparation or basis measurement has been
chosen. If there are reflective surfaces behind the encoding component in Alice or Bob, the
reflected light could carry information of that device setting back to Eve, providing her
more information about the key [46, 65, 147].
Detector control attack
In this attack, Eve takes control of the detection result in Bob by altering the property
of the detectors. An example of this type of attack is the blinding attack on APD [96].
In normal operation, APD is in a Geiger mode where reverse biasing above the threshold
such that the trigger by single-photon could cause measurable current from the detector.
However, by sending bright CW laser with appropriate brightness through the quantum
channel, Eve could lower the bias voltage across APD such that the APD is in the linear
mode, no longer sensitive to single-photon pulses (blinded) while a certain bright pulse
could induce a proportional electrical signal. Eve can then perform intercept-and-resend
attack and send her state as a bright pulse such that if Bob’s basis choice matches that of
hers, the response signal is higher than Bob’s threshold, triggering a ’click’, while the pulse
is split in the different basis causing a below the threshold signal and not being registered.
Similar attack on other detectors has been demonstrated [93, 90, 167, 140, 55]. A variant
of this attack on the TES detector shall be discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Quantum dot as a single-photon
source for satellite-based QKD
Author contributions
I reviewed the theoretical analysis and calculated the estimated key rate for both WCP
and quantum dot QKD system. Thomas Jennewein, Brendon L. Higgins, and I design
the experiment setup. Sara Hosseini, Arash Ahmadi, and Michael E Reimer help prepare
quantum dot. I programmed the devices’ control and post-processing. I derive the equa-
tion multi-photon probability with B. Higgins
Satellite-based QKD is a platform developed to extend the range of secure communica-
tion across the globe. Major challenges to the key generation of this platform are the chan-
nel transmission loss as well as limited fly-by time [15, 123]. In addition, post-processing
cost to handle imperfections of the photon source, such as multi-photon generation [58, 95],
further limits the chance of a successful key exchange during each satellite pass. Since the
operation cost of such a QKD system is high, having a system that can reliably generate a
secure key is crucial. This post-processing cost could be improved with a true single-photon
source. An ideal candidate is a semiconductor quantum dot [144], especially when it is
embedded in a photonic nanostructure [106, 108] [71]. A quantum dot emits on-demand
single photons, while the nanostructure around it guarantees the efficient and directional
light extraction [34, 170]. If the photonic nanostructure surrounding the quantum dot rel-
ative to its position is designed carefully, it creates a platform that could reliably generate
single-photon pulses with high rate and purity[128, 164]. Although single-photon sources’
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development using a semiconductor quantum dot is progressed rapidly, its application has
yet clearly demonstrated, especially for QKD. Most of the previous studies have been con-
ducted at the proof-of-concept level showing that the QKD with quantum dot source can
generate key up to the sifting step [60, 54][152].
This study compares the performance of a BB84 QKD system using a single-photon
source with a decoy-state BB84 system utilizing a weak coherent pulsed laser as the photon
source. Two different pumping methods were applied to excite the quantum dot; non-
resonant pumping scheme and two-photon resonant excitation scheme. We use the key-
rate equation with the finite-size effect from Ref. [16, 28] for the QKD system based on
decoy-state and the key rate equation from Ref. [19] to estimate the performance of the
QKD system using the quantum dot as the single-photon source. For both cases, we model
our calculation based on realistic conditions for satellite-based QKD, including channel
loss, fly-by time windows, noise, and finite-size effect. We also include coupling losses from
quantum dot emitter to the output source. [16, 19, 28].
4.1 Experiment setup
The sender part (Alice) of the system under study utilizes a polarizer and a half-wave plate
to encode one of the four polarization (Horizontal H, Vertical V, Diagonal D, and Anti-
diagonal A) to each photon pulses from photon source. The photons then passed through
the ND filters used to emulate channel loss. The beam then sent through the free-space
channel toward the receiver (Bob).
The QKD receiver under study uses a passive basis choice to analyze and detect
polarization-encoded light. Compared to active basis choice, a passive basis choice design
simplifies the system and reduces the number of active elements, as is generally desirable
for a satellite payload [16]. Its telescope consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter of 50 mm
with a focal length f = 250 mm), and a collimating lens L2 (diameter of 5 mm with
f = 11 mm). The collimated beam of . 2 mm diameter then passes through a 50:50 beam
splitter BS, and a pair of polarization beam splitters PBS1 and PBS2. The purpose of
PBS2 is to increase the polarization extinction ratio in the reflected path from PBS1. The
four lenses L3 focus the beams into four multi-mode fibers, each with a core diameter of
105 µm, which are connected to single-photon detectors. The detection in each detector is










































Figure 4.1: Experimental setup. For the WCP QKD experiment, the photon pulses are
sent directly from Ti:Sapphire laser to the QKD setup. For q. dot QKD, the quantum
dot is excited with the pulsed laser from Ti:Sapphire laser. A grating and a wedge mirror
are used to separate exciton pulses from bi-exciton pulses. The photons then sent to
the QKD system under test. In Alice, the polarization state is selected by a PBS and
a half-wave plate HWP mounted on a rotational stage. For each set of data collection,
the polarization is fixed to one of the four linear polarization orientation, horizontal (H),
vertical (V), diagonal (D), and anti-diagonal (A). The key generation rate is an average
of these four polarization settings. In a real implementation, the state preparation could
be done using one of the following setup. The first is to use a fiber-based polarization
modulator, which has a typical insertion loss of 4dB and a repetition rate of 1GHz [1].
Another option is to passively coupling together four QDs with dedicated polarization
orientation. The state can be selected by sending an excitation laser pulse to respective
QD for intended polarization in each time slot. This setup could reach the GHz level
repetition rate. A set of attenuator Att is used to select signal and decoy intensity in
the weak-coherent pulse (WCP) experiment, as well as simulate channel loss. For the
resonance excitation experiment, the source is replaced with the lower setup where notch
filter N and a single-mode fiber-coupled band-pass filter F are used to separate reflected
laser from single-photon emission.
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4.2 Weak-coherent pulse QKD
For weak-coherent QKD, the photon pulses from the Ti:Sapphire laser (The Coherent,
Mira Optima 900-P) is passed through an attenuator to reduce the mean photon number
per pulse, µ = 0.5 for signal pulses and ν = 0.1 for decoy pulses. Other parameters are set
following the study of satellite QKD in Ref. [15]. In our experiment, we record a series of
pulses in each channel transmission loss value, one polarization at a time. Each series is
recorded over 100 s, a typical usable link time of a QKD satellite. The statistical detection
rate, the error rate on the decoy, and the signal state are used to calculate the secret key
length. The key length of a decoy-state QKD with two intensity level can be written as
L ≥ nKµ
[
Y L1 (1− h(EU1 ))− fh(E)−Qµ∆/nµ
]
, (4.1)
where n and nµ are respectively total number of transmitted photon pulses and number
of detected signal pulses respectively. Y L1 and E
2
1 is respectively lower bound of single
photon gain and upper bound of QBER with a correction for finite size effect on decoy
state characterization [28], q =1/2 is sifting basis ratio, Kµ is fraction of pulse that are
signal state h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy, fh(E) is
information leakage during error correction for an observed error rate E and error correction
code efficiency f. ∆ is a correction term owing to the statistical deviation due to finite size
effect [28, 58, 95, 16]
A set of neutral density filters is inserted between Alice and Bob set up to simulate
transmission channel losses. The experimental raw key rate in each channel loss is an
average between all four polarization orientations in Alice. The estimated and experimental
key size as a function of channel loss is shown by the red line and red dots, respectively,
in 4.6.
4.3 Quantum Key Distribution with a sub-poissonian
photon source
In this experiment, we replaced the laser pulses signal and attenuator in the decoy-state
system with the single-photon signal from a wurtzite InAsP quantum dot embedded in a
tapered InP nanowire Ref.[128, 29]. We used off-resonant or incoherent pulsed pumping
scheme to excite the quantum dot. In this scheme, the quantum dot is excited above
the band-gap, which is the excitation at 830nm, the wurtzite InP nanowire band-gap
26
transition Ref.[40]. The photoluminescence (PL) of the quantum dot that we used is
shown in Fig. 4.2. The spectrum was captured by a single grating imaging spectrometer
(Acton SpecttraPro SP-2750). It was off-resonance excitation by 830nm laser pulses from
a Titanium-sapphire laser at 420nW of power. The laser has a repetition rate of 76.4MHz.
The quantum dot emits exciton photons at 892.67nm and biexciton photons at 894.2nm.
In order to separate these two emission lines, we sent the quantum dot emission to a
polarization-independent transmission grating (Lightsmyth T-1500-875) with 1504 grooves
per millimeter. The photons from the excitonic emission at 892.67nm were coupled to a
multi-mode optical fiber and sent to the QKD setup, as shown in Fig. 4.1. This setup does
not have an active switching device. In this QKD security analysis, we assume that the
phases of each photon pulse emitted from quantum dot are independent. For a practical
implementation, the phase randomization could be achieved by one of the following options.
The first is to use a fiber-based phase modulator, which has a typical insertion loss of 4dB
and a maximum repetition rate of 10MHz [4]. Second is using a free-space Pockels cell,
which has a speed limit of 20MHz [5]. Another option is to passively couple together four
QDs with dedicated polarization orientation. The polarization state can be selected by
sending an excitation laser pulse to respective QD for intended polarization in each time
slot. This setup could modulate polarization and achieve phase randomization at the GHz
level repetition rate and insertion loss of 3dB.
The QD source in this study has an internal loss of 15dB due to photon generation and
collection’s imperfections, resulting in a pulse rate of 2.6MHz. We chose the photons from
exciton emission as they have a higher rate compared to the biexcitonic emission. This
can be seen in Fig. 4.2.
As a figure of merit, the source has g2(0) of 0.015 while excited off-resonant. However,
g2(0) drops to less than 0.0015 when applying the two-photon resonant excitation scheme
(See Fig. 4.3). Although there is a special emphasis in semiconductor quantum optics on
the measurement of the second-order correlation function g2(0), recently it has been shown
that g2(0) < 1
2
only suggests non-zero single-photon contribution in the quantum state of
the light, without giving the exact probability of single or multi-photon emission Ref.[121].
This suggests that our source could still emit multiple-photon pulses. These multi-photons
permit an adversary Eve to perform a photon number splitting attack (PNS attack) and
gain information about the key. Taken this into account, we have the lower bound of key
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Figure 4.2: Spectrum of the QD emission excited at 830 nm, above band-gap non-resonant
excitation (NRE) scheme. The spectrum shows three peaks attributed to the exciton (X),
biexciton (XX), and charged exciton or trion (T ). The spectrum was taken by an imaging
spectrometer using a 1200 grooves/mm grating. Photo shows nanowirestructure of the QD
under study.
























where n is the number of sifted key, Ẽ = E + 1
2
√
{2 ln(1/εPE) + 2 ln(n+ 1)}(1/n) takes
into account a chance that the error rate estimated from a sifted key of size n in the
protocol might deviate from the actual value [130, 19, 142], εPE is the probability that
such deviation occurs. The single photon detection probability A = (pdet− pmulti)/pdet is a
correction term ruling-out Eve’s information due to multi-photon pulses [88], where pdet is
the probability of detection and pmulti is the probability of a multi-photon pulse generated
by Alice. Since the photon number distribution of the quantum dot is not known, the
direct calculation of the multi-photon pulse probability from a coherent state mean photon
number does not apply. Instead, we employ an alternative method to establish an upper
bound, Pm.
First, we notice from examining key exchange data using the four-detector receiver
apparatus that the frequency of three-way coincidence detection is vanishingly small. From
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our observation, the probability of having more than two detectors ’click’ within the same
time slot (5 ns) is less than 10−9 per detection, which is more than four orders of magnitude
lower than the double clicks probability. The probability of this triple-click falls within the
range of detection incidence due to background noise in the channel and darkcounts from
the detectors. This result implies that contributions beyond two photons may be neglected
compared to the pulses with two photons or lower.
We characterize the remaining two-photon contribution by examining detection events
of a train of photon pulses emitted from the quantum dot passing through a 50:50 beam-
splitter, with each output is coupled to an APD. The setup has coupling efficiency ηt = 10%.
The APD has detection efficiency ηd = 60%. From a 10 hours data collection time we assess
the number of coincident events C, where both detectors ‘click’ within the 5 ns window.





2 +O(ηD) +O(D2), (4.3)
where detection efficiency of the testing device is given by η = ηtηd, and D is darkcount
probability. We similarly also determine the number of ‘solitary’ events S where only one
detector clicks within the window,
S = p1η + p2η(
3
2
− η) +O(D). (4.4)
In this setup, the probability of darkcount per detection event is lower than 10−7 per
detection. Thus, the contribution of darkcounts in C and S is negligible. By combining
Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.3), we find
p2 =
2Kp1
η − 3K + 2Kη
, (4.5)
where K ≡ C/S. So long as the assumption that higher photon terms can be neglected
holds, we arrive at a bound for Pm,
Pm ≤
2KR
η − 3K + 2Kη
, (4.6)
making use of the probability of nonempty pulses R = p1 +p2 ≥ p1, which can be measured
directly from the source. From our measurement, we found K = 1.1× 10−5, η = 0.06, and
R = 0.033. Substitute these variables into Eq. (4.6), we got Pm ≤ 4.5× 10−6.
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4.3.1 Resonant excitation (TPE) scheme
There are two methods to pump the quantum dot to the excited state. The first one is
the non-resonant or incoherent pumping scheme, as we mentioned before. In this scheme,
the quantum dot is excited above the band-gap. This scheme is more common and easier
to implement. However, it limits the coherence and indistinguishability of the emitted
photons and increases the chance of multi-photon emission due to the charge capture in
the quantum dot potential. This problem can be overcome by resonant two-photon coher-
ent excitation (TPE) scheme to coherently populate the biexcitonic state in the quantum
dot. A resonant two-photon excitation (TPE) scheme was previously applied in a self-
assembled quantum dot Ref.[109]. Here, we implement this scheme to wurtzite InAsP
quantum dot embedded in a tapered InP nanowire. A shaped laser pulse with the wave-
length of 893.367 nm is used to excite the ground state of the quantum dot to the virtual
excitation state situated between the exciton and biexciton emission lines, as shown in
Fig. 4.3. Hence, the laser wavelength is chosen to be between the two emission lines in
the quantum dot. Pump intensity is set to the (so-called π pulse) where the inversion of
the quantum dot from the ground to the biexcitonic state is most probable. In this case,
one can deterministically populate a biexciton after each pulse with near-unity fidelity and
near-zero multi-photon emission. The challenge of this experiment is to suppress the scat-
tered excitation laser light. Previously, the polarization-suppression technique was used to
implement this scheme [9]. Here, we used three notch filters (OptiGrate BNF-894-OD4)
to attenuate the laser scattering. Fig. 4.4 (b) shows the photoluminescence spectrum of
the quantum dot under a two-photon resonant excitation scheme (TPE). The intensities
of the exciton (X) and biexciton (XX) emission lines are similar, and the charged exciton
emission is suppressed considerably.
4.3.2 g2 measurement
We measured g2(0) correlation using Hanbury Brown and Twiss (HBT) setup. After
correcting for the APDs darkcounts, the g2(0) for the non-resonant scheme is found to be
0.015, and for the two-photon resonance excitation scheme is less than 0.0015 as shown
in Fig. 4.5. It proves that the two-photon resonance excitation reduces the probability of
multi-photon emission dramatically.
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Figure 4.3: Two-photon resonant excitation scheme. A shaped pulse laser excites two
electrons from the ground state to the virtual state, that its energy is situated between the
exciton and biexciton emission lines.
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Figure 4.4: Spectrum of the QD emission excited at a) 830 nm, above band-gap non-
resonant excitation (NRE) scheme. The spectrum shows three peaks attributed to the
exciton (X), biexciton (XX), and charged exciton or trion (T ) b) two-photon resonant
excitation scheme using excitation laser at 893.367 nm. The exciton (X) and biexciton
(XX) have almost the same intensities, and the trion (T ) has been suppressed dramatically.
This proves that exciton and biexciton photons are emitted in pairs, and no charge is
captured that can result in charged exciton emission. The small peak between the exciton
and biexciton emission lines is due to the scattered laser light residual. Both spectrums
were taken by an imaging spectrometer using a 1200 grooves/mm grating
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Figure 4.5: Autocorrelation histograms, under non-resonant-excitation scheme (blue curve)
and two-photon resonant excitation scheme (red curve). The data are presented without
any corrections.
4.4 Result and discussion
Using the parameters found in the measurement, we can calculate the Quantum dot QKD
system’s key rate using Eq. (4.2). The experimental result and theoretical simulation are
shown in Fig. 4.6. The effective loss tolerance of the Quantum dot QKD system excited
off-resonance using a pulsed laser with nearly 80MHz repetition rate is ≈ 25dB (green line
in Fig. 4.6), higher than the decoy-state protocol with 80MHz repetition rate (red line).
The performance of Quantum dot QKD can be improved by reducing the source’s
internal loss. We calculate the key rate for a QKD system with the Quantum dot source
under the test but without internal loss. The result shows that, if the internal loss of
the source is eliminated, the loss tolerance of the system could reach 32dB ( blue line in
Fig. 4.6), surpassing a decoy-state QKD system with 300MHz repetition rate ( black line
in Fig. 4.6).
Although the Quantum dot under the study improves the performance of QKD system;
it has been excited using the off-resonance excitation scheme, which is not an optimal
performance of the quantum dot source. Applying two-photon resonance excitation will
reduce the multi-photon emission and the lifetime of the quantum dot excited state. Since
the repetition rate of quantum dots is limited by the lifetime of the excited state, this
will help to excite the source with a higher excitation rate resulting in the higher count
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Figure 4.6: Secret key size over 100s key exchange (with finite-size effect) as a function
of channel loss. (Red) Decoy-state with 80MHz, (Green) Quantum dot-QKD with 80MHz
excitation frequency and 10dB internal loss, (Blue) theoretical calculation of the Quantum
dot QKD system with 80MHz excitation frequency and no internal loss, (black) theoretical
calculation of decoy-state at 300MHz. In this comparison, we assumed that the phase of
the photons in each pulse of both WCP and QD are independent. In practice, the phase
randomization device would induce ≈ 3 dB internal loss in both cases. The key generation
rates in both cases would be proportionally lower. The advantage of QD-QKD still hold.
rate. The state-of-the-art quantum dot that benefits from the careful design of polarized
microcavities has a lifetime of ≈ 60ps [164], and can be driven on resonance by up to
GHz-frequency level pulsed laser. This is equivalent to the frequency used in high-speed
WCP QKD today [49, 32, 165]. This result demonstrates that quantum dot can indeed be
a promising source for BB84 QKD protocol.
4.5 Conclusion
This study compares the performance of Quantum dot QKD and WCP QKD under the
finite-size effect. We propose a method to characterize and calculate an upper bound of
multi-photon emission. The experimental result shows that a quantum dot QKD system
with a 76.4MHz repetition rate and 15dB internal loss could outperform a decoy-state
QKD with the same repetition rate, especially at high channel transmission loss. The
performance of Quantum dot QKD could be improved further by reducing the internal
loss and increasing the photon generation rate. This result shows that QKD with a single-
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photon source could be a candidate for secure communication with high channel loss, for
example, satellite-based QKD. We hope this would spark an interest in the development
of QKD with a true single-photon source. We also hope that this study will raise attention
toward further development of quantum dot as a single-photon source, as well as other




characterization on QKD sysyem
Author contributions
Vadim Makarov, Norbert Lütkenhaus, and Martin Ward provided advice on the exist-
ing characterization model. I calculate and analyze the characterization method against
a generalized attack. With Vadim Makarov, we proposed an improved characterization
methodology
Trojan-horse attack on a quantum key distribution (QKD) system uses the reflec-
tion of bright light back from the system’s internal components. This reflected light
might pass through encryption/decryption components, carrying secret information to
an eavesdropper Eve. Several studies have demonstrated the feasibility of this attack
[160, 46, 63, 64, 147, 137]. A modified security proof has been derived that calculates the
key rate in the presence of a characterized upper-bounded level of backreflection, with the
characterization guaranteed by a series of passive optical components [87]. The latter study
also outlines an experimental characterization method for the backreflection level. A similar
methodology is present in the current draft of a group specification for characterization and
countermeasure against the Trojan-horse attack [6], written by the industry specification
group on the quantum key distribution (ISG-QKD) at the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI). Here we show that this drafted methodology underestimates
the backreflection. We model how Eve can carefully modulate the phase and timing of
each Trojan-horse pulse and significantly increase the intensity of reflected light via the
interference effect.
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This Comment serves as a brief critical remark on the currently available methodology
in Refs. [87, 6].
5.0.1 Problem with characterization method
In order to upper-bound the intensity of reflected Trojan-horse pulses, reflectivity char-
acterization of the QKD system’s internal components has been proposed [87, 6]. The
proposed method focuses on signal encoding and transmitting side of the system (Alice).
The optical components in Alice are divided into two blocks [Fig. 5.1(a)]. First, the front
block consists of an optical filter (F), isolator (I), and attenuator (A). Trojan-horse pulses
reflected from these components do not pass through the encoding device, i.e., the phase
modulator (PM). Thus, those reflected pulses do not carry information about the PM
setting to Eve. Second, the backreflection block [Fig. 5.1(b)] consists of a polarizing beam-
splitter (PBS), beamsplitter (BS), air gap, intensity modulator (IM), connectors (J2, J3,
J4), and the PM itself. The Trojan-horse pulses reflected off these components might pass
through the PM. Hence, the method proposed in Ref. [87] assumes that the total intensity
that could carry phase information of the PM could be determined by a sum of the total
reflectivity of all the components in this block, and a physical limit of Eve’s incoming
Trojan pulse intensity. Eve’s intensity limit is assumed to be a fiber damage threshold
at the entrance of the system. The characterization of component’s reflectivity is done
by sending pulsed laser into the backreflection block and performing optical time-domain
reflectometry, as shown in Fig. 5.1(b). The measured intensities of reflected pulses from
all the components are then summed together (Sec. IV B in Ref. [87]), giving the total
reflectivity. However, with this method, the actual reflectivity Eve could achieve would be
underestimated.
Eve can send multiple laser pulses with proper time delay such that all backreflected
pulses pass the last component behind the PM at the same time. Furthermore, she can tune
the phase of each pulse such that all the reflected pulses pass through the last component
in-phase and interfere constructively. This results in a higher reflected intensity than
expected in the original method.
For example, let’s consider two laser pulses with input amplitude E1 and E2 reflected




Figure 5.1: Reflection from different components of a QKD system under test (reprinted
from Ref. [87]). (a) The components inside the QKD system under test are divided into
two block separated by R dashed line: the front block to the right, and backreflection
block to the left. (b) Experimental setup for reflectivity characterisation and an optical
time-domain reflectometry trace showing reflectivity of each component.
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pulses be φ. The total intensity of the backreflected pulse is









2 + 2E1r1E2r2 cosφ
≤ (E1r1 + E2r2)2.
One can see that if the two pulses are in phase (φ = 0), the total intensity is higher than the
sum of individual intensities. To give a clearer picture, let us assume that input amplitudes
are equal E1 = E2 = 1, and the pulses reflect from a glass surface with reflectivity of 4%.
The total reflected intensity will be as high as ≈ 16% instead of ≈ 8% expected from the
sum of the reflection intensities. A similar concept is used to create a Bragg reflector where
multiple layers of weakly reflecting materials could yield a total reflectivity approaching
unity when the thickness of each layer matches the wavelength of the input light. The
difference in our case is that Eve tunes the phase of each of her input pulse to compensate
for the phase shift between the reflecting components instead of controlling the path length
between the reflective surfaces. As an alternative to the active phase tuning, she could
wait until a natural drift of the optical delays inside Alice randomly aligns the phases of
her pulses for constructive interference, and execute the Trojan-horse attack in the limited
time while the phases remain aligned.
A similar calculation could be done for a larger number of reflective surfaces. From this




Ei is the input amplitude at component i, and ri is the reflectivity of that component. Fig-
ure 5.1(b) shows the reflectivity of each component inside a sample QKD system presented
in Ref. [87]. We use this data to showcase the discrepancy between the two methods. We
follow the original method and use the sum of reflections in the short and long arms (black
trace in the plot) from all the components in the backreflection block (grey-shaded in the
scheme). The reflectivities we have read from the plot are approximately −45 dB for PBS,
−67.5 for air-gap, −62.5 for PM, −72.5 for BS, −50 for J2, −67.5 for J4, −65 for IM, and
−67.5 dB for J3. Our calculated sum reflectivity is −42.74 dB, which matches −42.87 dB
given in Ref. [87]. However the total reflectivity when all the reflected pulses are in-phase
is −36.58 dB, i.e., significantly higher.
5.0.2 Solutions
We see two possible ways to tackle this problem. The first method is to change the total
reflected light formula from I =
∑
i (Eiri)




i µi as used in Ref. [87] to I = [
∑
i (Eiri)]
2. This will give a tighter bound
on reflectivity, assuming all reflective surfaces at all possible wavelengths are characterized.
However, fulfilling the latter assumption in practice may be challenging. A metrological
method would need to be developed carefully.
An alternative is to assume the worst case that the total reflectivity from Alice’s back-
reflection block is unity, and assume that intensity of Eve’s Trojan-horse pulse is reduced
only by transmission loss in Alice’s components in the front block. Although this method
gives a pessimistic bound of reflection, it takes care of all unknown reflective surfaces and
wavelength-dependent characteristics that might not have been characterized. This would
also simplify the characterization procedures significantly. In fact, this option is already
included in the draft group specification [6] in its Sec. 6.3. We advise the users to consider
this method as their primary until a better option is developed.
5.0.3 Further deviation from model
In addition to the issue discussed above, another deviation of the model in the charac-
terization method is that the reflected pulses from the front-block components (A, I, and
F) are being neglected. Eve might treat these reflected pulses as, for example, additional
coherent light sources serving as local oscillators, and this part of the scheme serving as
her homodyne detector. We could neither prove nor disprove that the presence of these
backreflections gives Eve an advantage. This deviation from the model needs to be studied.
5.0.4 Conclusion
We have shown that the experimental characterization method for QKD systems outlined
in Refs. [87, 6] is insufficient, and an improved method should be developed. We have
given a simple calculation and an example based on experimental data that shows that
Eve could induce higher reflected intensity than originally predicted. We have suggested
two possible solutions: a unity reflectivity assumption (which is already an option in the
draft group specification [6]), and modification of the upper-bound reflectivity formula.
Lastly, a further investigation of possible attacks taking advantage of reflections from the
front-block components is encouraged.
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Chapter 6
Security verification of practical
QKD systems
Many cryptographic schemes experienced many unexpected behaviors of the physical device
that deviated from theoretical assumptions. Worst, some of those flaws open side-channels
for Eve or hackers to exploit, compromising the security. To improve the security of
practical implementation, the developers need to characterize their system and close the
existing loophole, while hackers continue to seek unknown loopholes in the patched system.
This presumably unending loop of attacking and patching, in turn, drove the development
of classical communications to the level of security we have today.
Many QKD protocols and schemes have been introduced in the past decades. Many
proof-of-concept experiments have been realized; some developed to be fully functional
QKD systems; some evolved even further to commercialization. As we learned from the
classical system, no matter how high the level of security of the protocol is promised in
theory, it is utmost necessary to test the function of the real system. Not only does this
make sure that it is working as predicted in theory, but it also tests its resilience against
any disturbance of Eve. Some of the systems have already been put to the testing and
patching loop[138, 63, 67, 151, 91, 125, 97, 160]. Many vulnerabilities have been found,
and many countermeasures have been developed. By repeating these loops of hacking and
patching, the level of security, promised in theory, can be reached, eventually.
This section is a collection of examples of security verification of practical quantum
key distribution systems. The goal of these studies is to find imperfections of the physical
implementation of the respective QKD system or device under test. We then use that
information to model possible attack models and introduce possible countermeasures. In
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some cases, the countermeasure itself has been tested. This loop of testing(hacking) and
introducing countermeasure(patching) is an important step toward the standardization of
QKD, and the unconditional security promised in theory.
6.1 Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash
side channel in quantum cryptography
This section is cited from our study “Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash
side channel in quantum cryptography” published in [122].
Author contributions
With Paulo Vinicius Pereira Pinheiro Rolf T Horn, Jean-Philippe Bourgoin, and Shihan
Sajeed, we experimentally characterize the backflash photon characteristics of the device
under test. With Paulo Vinicius Pereira Pinheiro, and Vadim Makarov, we design and
perform experiment on QKD receiver prototype. I analyzed and designed an attack model
based on the experiment results. Norbert Lütkenhaus and Thomas Jennewein provided
advice on countermeasures.
The security of QKD requires that the choice of basis of Bob’s measurement is not
known to Eve. It has been known for a long time [112] that a reverse-biased p-n junction
in a silicon avalanche photodiode in Geiger mode emits light upon the detection of a
photon. Chynoweth and McKay [24] reported a detailed study of the phenomenon and
predicted that the light emission originates due to the recombination of the energetic
electrons and holes in the avalanche breakdown region. Subsequently, several other papers
stated distinct possible causes for the phenomenon and quantified this emission [163, 23,
43, 75, 10, 116, 56]. In 2001, Kurtsiefer and his coworkers [74] raised the question: can
this emission from the detectors employed in practical quantum communication systems
affect the security? The outcome of their study suggested that the backflash photons might
leak information about the detection to Eve, though the leakage of information was not
quantified. Recently, a study about the backflash in InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) was done [103]. The latter also suggests the possibility that Eve could measure
the state of backflash photons and learn about detection in the receiver without causing
errors in the key.
The quantum state of the backflash photons is not expected to be correlated to that
of the photon that triggered the effect. However, and unfortunately, from a security point
of view, the backflash photons may pass through other security-critical components of
Bob’s receiver and carry out information about the state of those components back to
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the channel. For example, in polarization-based QKD with a passive basis-choice scheme,
backflash photons from the horizontal (vertical) detectors will come out into the channel
horizontally (vertically) polarized when they pass different arms of polarization beam-
splitters (PBSes). In this case, Eve can measure the polarization of the backflash photons
and predict with high probability which detector they originated from, thus compromising
the security. Another possible method of distinguishing backflash photons from different
channels is monitoring the difference in time delay of backflash photons from each channel.
However, for the device studied in this article, preliminary tests have shown that the
difference in time delay of backflash between channels is not sufficiently distinguishable
to be used to determine the source of backflash. Thus, we do not investigate the latter
method here.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1.1, we characterize backflash emission
probability from APD and photomultiplier tube (PMT) instead of InGaAs/InP studied in
Ref. [103]. Furthermore, in Section 6.1.2, we characterize backflash photons from a free-
space polarization encoding receiver and use that information to demonstrate a practical
attack on the receiver. We also quantify the information leakage to Eve in this attack
scheme. In Section 6.1.4, we introduce a countermeasure for this attack that reduces
the reverse transmission efficiency of the receiver from the detectors to channel to reduce
information leakage. We also introduce a characterization procedure and modify the key
rate equation to take into account the remaining information leakage. We conclude in
Section 6.4.4.
6.1.1 Characterization of backflash emission
In order to study the effect of backflash photon emission during the avalanche breakdown,
a series of experiments are conducted on two different types of detectors. The first device
tested is a Si-APD detector module (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-12-FC) with a circular active
area of 180 µm and peak photon detection efficiency of 0.7 at 700 nm [7]. The second
device tested is a PMT (Hamamatsu H7422P-40), which has a GaAsP photocathode, with
5 mm diameter and a peak photon detection efficiency of 0.4 at 580 nm [8]. Both are
thermoelectrically cooled.
Si avalanche photodiode
The first step in quantifying the information leakage is to find the probability of backflash
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Figure 6.1: Setup for measuring probability of backflash emission. (a) Two identical APDs
are connected with a 2 m long multimode (MM) fiber causing 10 ns optical delay between
the two detectors. An electronic delay line of 40 ns is added so that the backflash photons
from SPCM could also be recorded. (b) To perform spectral analysis, a free-space inter-
ference narrowpass filter is added to the setup. The filter represents one often used at the
entrance of a practical QKD receiver.
that leaks out of the detector. To find the value of Pb, we perform a measurement using
the setup in Fig. 6.1(a). Two identical APD modules, one marked as device under test
(DUT) and another marked as single-photon counting module (SPCM), are connected by
a 2 m long 105 µm core diameter multimode fiber (Thorlabs M43L01). Click coincidences
between them are recorded by a time interval analyzer (Stanford Research Systems SR620).
In this setup, we record clicks caused by dark counts in the DUT. We record until the total
clicks in DUT reach N = 106, and plot the histograms of coincidence clicks between the
two detectors in Fig. 6.2. The right-most peak represents the backflash photons from DUT
coupled through the fiber and detected by SPCM, which occur ≈ 10 ns after the detections
in DUT owing to the optical delay. We have added a 40 ns electrical delay so that the
coincidence click appears at a delay of ≈ 50 ns in the plot. This also allows us to see the
backflash from SPCM recorded by DUT, which is the left-most peak having a similar shape
but time-inversed. The shape of the coincidence peak roughly matches that of the current
flowing through the APD IAPD, which we have measured using a small resistor added at the
APD’s cathode and a wideband differential oscilloscope probe. We divide the histogram
into three regions. Region I shows rapid increase in coincidence counts that resembles the
exponential increase of the number of avalanche electrons flowing through the APD. Region
II shows decay in the coincidence counts resembling the decrease of avalanche electrons
owing to the voltage across the APD dropping as its capacitance discharges. Region III is
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where the voltage across the APD is further lowered below breakdown by the quenching
circuit. At that time the photon emission drops to near zero. The rough match between
the current shape and the photon emission suggests that the backflash photons originate
from the electric current across the APD during the avalanche.
We count coincident clicks C within the right-hand peak. Here, we take into account
channel transmission efficiency T = 0.97, and average detection efficiency of the SPCM in
500–900 nm spectral band η = 0.6 [7]. Since the SPCM can only detect photons efficiently
in this narrow spectral band, our measurement provides only a lower bound estimate of
Pb & C/(ηTN). We note that this and subsequent calculations of backflash probability are
approximate in the case where Pb  1. For this specific setup, there are 37643 coincident
detections, corresponding to Pb & 0.065. Furthermore, we have measured the electrical
charge flowing through the APD per avalanche, by monitoring the current consumption
from the high-voltage bias source. We have found that the APD under test passes on
average ne− = 2.7 × 108 electrons through the APD per avalanche. The probability of
backflash photon emission per avalanche electron Pe− & Pb/ne− = 2.4× 10−10. We remark
that a detector circuit that reduces ne− would be expected to have lower backflash.
While the wideband measurement above is imprecise, many free-space QKD setups
employ a narrowband spectral filter at Bob’s entrance, in order to cut background light
entering Bob [18, 57, 73, 72, 15]. The same filter would restrict the backflash emission to
the narrow band that can be measured much more precisely in our setup. We have added
a free-space narrowpass filter with center wavelength of 808 nm and bandwidth of 3 nm
[see Fig. 6.1(b)], in order to mimic spectral filter inside a practical QKD receiver [15]. We
have repeated the counting process and found 2306 coincident detections. At this specific
wavelength, the SPCM has detection efficiency of 0.62 [7]. The coupling efficiency of the
channel in this setup is T = 0.83. The probability of at least one backflash photon leaking
through this filter is P filterb = 4.5 × 10−3. The spectral filter indeed reduces the emission
significantly, which reduces the information leakage as we prove later in Section 6.1.4.
We have performed another measurement to characterize the spectral distribution of
the backflash photons, using a sensitive spectrum analyzer (Acton Spectrapro 2750). Un-
fortunately, we could not fully calibrate the spectrum analyzer for this specific setup, and
the result is only qualitative. The measurement indicates that the backflash emission is
broadband, spanning continuously from 550 nm to >1000 nm with a gentle peak around
900 nm (see Section 6.1.3). This broadband characteristic leads to the possibility of in-
cluding a narrow bandpass spectral filter in the system. The filter limits the wavelength
range in which the backflash probability needs to be characterised, reduces the backflash
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of time-intervals (dark grey) measured from the coincident clicks
from the setup in Fig. 6.1. The peak on the right is backflash from DUT detected by SPCM.
Regions I, II, and III of the histogram represent different stages of detector operation
cycle. The shape of histogram resembles the APD current IAPD (green line, measured
separately). The current shape is not exact owing to a finite common-mode rejection ratio
of the differential probe used to measure IAPD. The apparent abrupt drop of current at the
border between regions II and III is common-mode interference from the quenching circuit
that lowers the bias voltage and thus ends the avalanche. This coincides with a drop of




Photomultiplier tube (PMT) is another type of detector widely used for its larger sensitive
area and moderate dark count rate [52]. We have replaced DUT in Fig. 6.1 (a) with a PMT
unit. Since the dark count rate of the PMT is low, additional weak laser pulses have been
coupled to the active area of PMT to induce clicks. After recording 106 counts in the PMT,
we have found fewer than 100 coincidences for both the fiber and free-space setups. This
coincidence level is close to the dark count level of the SPCM, implying that the probability
of backflash in PMT is negligible within the spectral range of our measurement.
6.1.2 Eavesdropping experiment
In this section, we experimentally quantify Eve’s ability to identify which detector the
backflash photons originated from, by measuring the backflash photon’s polarization state.
Bob’s receiver used in this test is an integrated receiver built by INO (National Optics
Institute of Canada) designed for a free-space passive polarization encoding QKD system
running at 785 nm. Fig. 6.3 shows its optical scheme. The receiver consists of a pinhole
to prevent spatial mode attack [135], coupling lens to focus incoming beam into optical
fibers, and an integrated optics module. The latter consists of a beamsplitter (BS) to
passively select the basis of measurement and PBSes in each basis to discriminate the
four polarizations of the incoming photons: horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D), and
antidiagonal (A). Next, we characterize the backflash emission as a possible side channel.
Reverse loss and extinction ratio
As the photons back-propagate through the setup, they experience the reverse loss of the
receiver, i.e., the loss from originating detector to the channel input. This could reduce
probability that backflash photon leaks into the channel. The setup shown in Fig. 6.4 is
used to estimate this loss. An 808 nm laser (wavelength close to the operating wavelength
of the receiver) is connected to the receiver’s output multimode fiber, one channel at a time.
The laser power at the end of receiver’s fiber is P1 = 40 µW. We adjust the polarization
controller PC to maximize throughput power, providing an upper bound of the reverse
transmission. We then measure laser power P2 emitted at the front of the receiver module,
between the focusing lens and receiver’s pinhole in 6.4. The reverse transmission efficiency
of the receiver for the optimum polarization is then Tb = P2/P1. We have measured the

















Figure 6.3: Receiver designed by INO working as a passive basis choice polarization ana-
lyzer at 785 nm. Top: the important optical components consists of a pinhole, coupling
lens, beamsplitter (BS), and polarizing beamsplitters (PBSes). Bottom: photo of the



















Figure 6.4: Setup for measurement of the reverse propagation loss and polarization extinc-
tion ratio. An 808 nm laser is connected to each of the output channels of the receiver,
one at a time. A 90:10 reflection:transmission (R:T) ratio beamsplitter diverts the reverse
propagating beam to the measurement unit. The latter consists of a fiber-coupled optical
power meter, and a rotating PBS to measure power and polarization extinction ratio of the
reverse propagation beam. A polarization controller PC is used to maximize throughput
power from each receiver channel.
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Table 6.1: Reverse propagating extinction ratio measurement of Bob’s setup. The pho-
tons from H and V channel could be distinguished with high probability. The measured
extinction ratios of A and D channels are low, presumably owing to polarization becoming












H 3 25.0 91 0.15 167
V 94 19.8 1 0.03 660
D 315 20.7 223 1.94 10.7
A 49 23.5 141 3.69 6.4
(the individual values lie in the range 0.088 to 0.094). Assuming backflash photons are
randomly polarized, their transmission should be approximately half of this upper bound.
Next, we demonstrate Eve’s ability to distinguish the originating channel of backflash
photon. For that, we measure polarization extinction ratio of the reverse emitted beam
from the receiver. In Fig. 6.4, a 90:10 reflection:transmission (R:T) ratio beamsplitter is
added to divert the outgoing beam from the receiver to a measurement unit consisting
of a PBS and a fiber-coupled optical power meter. This additional setup has throughput
efficiency Te = 0.60. For each receiver channel input, we rotate the PBS to find a pair of
angles that results in maximum and minimum power at the power meter. The optimal
angles for each channel and respective extinction ratios are shown in Table 6.1. The
drastically lower extinction ratio in D and A polarization is likely a result of polarization
distortion caused by Fresnel effect on the dielectric mirror and the 90:10 BS used by Eve.
These reflective surfaces were aligned at a certain angle along the axis corresponding to
V polarization. This alignment distorted the diagonal polarization of the reflected beam,
by inducing a phase difference between its H and V polarization components. In real
eavesdropping, Eve can correct this polarization distortion using a phase compensator or
waveplate. She can also split the incoming backflash photons into two PBSes oriented at
the angles that yield the highest extinction ratios in both bases. This should allow her to



















Figure 6.5: Eavesdropping setup for timing characterization and proof-of-principle attack.
The 90:10 R:T BS diverts photons from Bob to Eve’s detector. Eve’s setup consists of
a PBS that can be rotated to find the optimal angle for Eve to distinguish the source of
backflash photon. The time interval analyser (TIA) is used to find the time delay of the
backflash photon in the channel. The timetagging unit records coincidence time between
Bob’s and Eve’s detections in the proof-of-principle attack.
Timing of backflash photons through the receiver
The previous experiment suggests that by measuring the polarization of the backflash
photons, Eve could estimate which detector they originated from. However, in real life
scenario, Eve’s detection might not solely be from the backflash photons; it can be a result
of stray light in the channel, reflection of Alice’s signal from Bob’s optical components
or dark counts in Eve’s detector – all unwanted noise. To avoid those unwanted signals,
Eve needs to synchronize her measurement apparatus with Alice and Bob’s signal pulses,
and activate her detector at a specific time when the backflash photons are expected to
arrive. The synchronization can be done by monitoring Alice’s and Bob’s signals prior
to the eavesdropping. This section demonstrates a practical setup to measure timing
characteristics of the backflash photons.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 6.5. A train of 3 ns wide laser pulses with
200 ns period is sent to Bob’s receiver to simulate signals from Alice. The detector used as
DUT in Section 6.1.1 is connected to one channel of the receiver at a time. A time interval
analyzer (TIA) is used to record the coincidence time between the signal sent by Alice and
Eve’s SPCM clicks. In Fig. 6.6, we plot two histograms of the coincidence time from the
APD in H channel. The green histogram is the coincidence time when DUT is powered off.
Thus the detections in Eve resulted from reflections from the receiver’s optical components.






















Figure 6.6: Histogram of time intervals between emitting Alice’s laser pulse and detection
in Eve’s SPCM. The histogram with DUT powered on (red) has an area of coincidence peak
well above the level when DUT is powered off (green). The timing of this area matches the
optical time delay between Eve’s receiver and DUT, indicating backflash emission. The
other peaks are optical reflections in the setup (see text for details).
the setup and Eve’s SPCM. The leftmost peak is a result of backreflection off the free-space
optics at the front of Bob, such as his lenses and BS. The next peak matches the time delay
from fiber splices in the receiver’s fiber, indicated by short bars in Fig. 6.5. The third peak
is the backreflection from the APD (in H channel only, as the fiber in the other channels
has been terminated with matching gel that eliminates backreflections). The time delay of
the right-most peak matches the round-trip of triple reflection between the APD and fiber
splice. The red histogram is the coincidence time when DUT is powered on. Extra counts
due to backflash photons can clearly be seen at 80–87 ns. The time delay matches optical
delay between DUT and Eve’s SPCM. Since the coincident counts of backflash events are
≈ 1.5 orders of magnitude higher than the back-reflection and noise level, the probability
of Eve registering back-reflected pulses within this time window is small. Similar result
could be seen when connecting the DUT to V, D, and A channels.
6.1.3 Spectral distribution measurement
Figure 6.7 shows the spectral distribution of backflash emission measured with a sensitive
spectrum analyzer (Acton Spectrapro 2750). Due to difficulties we have encountered in
spectrometer calibration, this measurement has a large margin of error comparing with
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the narrow-band filter measurement at a specific wavelength. Thus, we omit this result
from the main Article. Even so, this measurement shows some important characteristics
of backflash emission. The backflash emission is broadband, spanning continuously across
our range of measurement from 550 to 1000 nm with a gentle peak around 900 nm. This
suggest the possibility of having backflash emission beyond our range of measurement.
This emphasizes the necessity of adding the narrow-band filter to ease the characterization
process and limit the information leakage.






















Figure 6.7: Spectral distribution of backflash.
Proof-of-principle eavesdropping demonstration
We next emphasize the threat of this attack by demonstrating Eve’s performance using
a practical setup, shown in Fig. 6.5. In this experiment, we demonstrate Eve’s ability to
distinguish backflash emissions in one basis, between H and V channels. We only consider
those photons that are coupled back to the optical channel and thus could carry information
to Eve. We first repeat the alignment procedure as described in Section 6.1.2 by sending
laser beam through the receiver’s fibers, and rotating the PBS in Eve to find two optimal
angles where the detection rate from the laser sent through Bob’s H channel is maximum
but V channel is minimum, and vise versa. Bob is then equipped with four powered-on
APDs, one at each channel of the receiver, as in a real QKD setup. As seen in Section 6.1.2,
Eve needs to register the coincidence counts within a specific time window to filter out
back-reflection events. For that, we replace TIA with a timetagger (Dotfast Consulting
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78-ps resolution 8-channel module) set to register the events where Eve’s detector clicks
within 25–30 ns after Bob’s detection, which matches the time delay between Bob’s and
Eve’s detectors. A train of 3 ns wide laser pulses with 200 ns period are sent to Bob to
simulate QKD signal pulses from Alice. For each orientation of Eve’s PBS, we count the
number of detections in Bob and coincidence count in Eve over 10 s. We record the ratio of
coincidence events Rij = Eij/Bi, where Bi is the number of clicks in Bob’s ith detector, and
Eij is the number of Eve’s coincident clicks with Bob’s ith detector when she sets her PBS
angle to maximise clicks from Bob’s channel j. For example, RHH represents probability of
a click in Bob’s H channel causing a coincident click while Eve aligns her PBS to measure
signal from H channel, i.e., the probability that Eve gets a correct detection.
The probability of Eve gaining information (about H channel detection) is the chance
of getting correct detection (RHH) less the chance that she gets a wrong detection (RHV ).
Note that the backflash probability Pb and reverse transmission efficiency Tb are already
accounted in these coincidence ratios. Our measurements show that, for Bob’s H detection,
RHH = 5.00 × 10−3 and RHV = 1.45 × 10−3, causing information leakage of 3.5 × 10−3.
For Bob’s V detection, RV V = 5.69 × 10−3 and RV H = 3.66 × 10−3, causing information
leakage of 2.0×10−3. From the calibration measurements we have expected the information
leakage to be less than ηTeTbPb/2 = 1.1×10−3, which poorly matches the leakage observed
in the eavesdropping experiment. We could not explain this discrepancy.
This result shows that Eve could learn a fraction of Bob’s detections by monitoring the
backflash photons. On the one hand, the information leakage is small, and we don’t have
the spectral filter in Bob in this experiment. On the other hand, our Eve’s setup is not an
optimal one for the attack. Proper countermeasures both in physical implementation and
in post-processing step need to be considered.
6.1.4 Countermeasure
In this section, we discuss about possible countermeasures for attacks exploiting backflash
photons. For physical implementation, using PMT can eliminate the possibility of gen-
erating backflash photons (although this conclusion is subject to the limitations of our
measurement in Section 6.1.1). Another possible countermeasure is using measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [85, 84], in which the detection outcomes are public,
thus Eve gains no new information from the backflash. However implementation of MDI-
QKD in free-space is challenging [126, 77, 31]. If a non-MDI-QKD system uses APDs, the
information leakage could be limited by decreasing reverse transmission efficiency Tb either
by adding narrow-band spectral filter as shown in Section 6.1.1, or an optical isolator.
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These measures could reduce but not eliminate the leakage of information. The remaining
leakage needs to be taken into account when calculating the required shortening of the key
during privacy amplification.
The following procedure could be employed. Bob follows the procedure in Section 6.1.1
to find the APD’s probability of backflash Pb and receiver’s reverse transmission efficiency
Tb. This Tb includes all optical isolators and filters added to the receiver to limit the
information leakage. If Bob does not include a narrow-pass filter, these parameters need to
be characterized in a very wide spectral range, because typical free-space optics and air are
transparent in a wide spectral band. This wide spectral characterization will be challenging.
However, if a band-pass filter is used, it is sufficient to characterize the parameters over
its spectral pass-band. From the result in Section 6.1.2, it is reasonable to assume that in
the worst case, with ideal equipment, Eve could distinguish the origin of backflash photons
with certainty. The information leakage to Eve is then PE = PbTb. In other words, a
fraction PE of Bob’s detections is tagged by Eve without disturbing the quantum state or
inducing error. Then the privacy amplification for QKD with tagged signal [51, 88] can be
used to take care of the information leakage.
As an example, let us consider the key rate equation for the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol in QKD system with single-photon signals. Under the backflash attack,
the secret key rate per signal sent by Alice becomes
l ≥ APdet(1− h(
e
A
))− leakEC , (6.1)
where Pdet is the probability of detection per signal, e is the error rate, h(x) = −x log x−
(1−x) log(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy, and leakEC is the portion of key disclosed
during error correction. The correction term A = (Pdet − PE)/Pdet, where PE is the
information leakage calculated in the characterization step above.
The theoretical analysis in this paper considers only the worst-case scenario where Eve
has the ability to collect and distinguish all backflash photons and map them to the raw
key in Alice and Bob. This analysis also provides only the lower bound on the secret key
rate, which could be improved by more careful analysis.
6.1.5 Conclusion
We have quantified the backflash emission of photons from APD-based single-photon detec-
tors, and verified that these photons can be used by an eavesdropper to learn about the key
in QKD systems. We have found that, for a system without spectral filter, at least 0.065 of
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the clicks in actively-quenched Si detector module result in backflash. This probability is
reduced by a factor of 14 when a narrowband spectral filter is added, suggesting the latter
is an efficient countermeasure. For PMT the backflash emission is negligible within the
sensitivity of our measurement. Our experiment with a real polarization-encoding QKD
receiver shows that Eve can distinguish polarization of backflash photons with near cer-
tainty. The proof-of-principle attack shows that Eve could learn 2.0× 10−3 fraction of raw
key using our today’s imperfect setup. The information leakage may be higher for an ideal
Eve. To close this loophole, we discuss a procedure to characterize the system and quantify
Eve’s information, then modify the key rate equation to take care of the information leak-
age due to backflash emission. We hope that our study will contribute to the development
of certification and standardization of practical QKD against side-channels.
6.2 Eavesdropper’s ability to attack a free-space quantum-
key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbu-
lence
This section is cited from our study ”Eavesdropper’s ability to attack a free-space quantum-
key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence” published in [22].
Author contributions
Vadim Makarov and Thomas Jennewein provided advise on experimental setup. Katanya
B. Kuntz wrote program to generate phase hologram for the SLM. I wrote a programs to
control and synchronize the experiment setup. I performed experiment with assistance of
Anqi Huang, Jean Philippe Bourgoin, and Shihan Sajeed. With Katanya B. Kuntz, we
process the experiment result and analyze practical limit of the attack. Yanbao Zhang and
Norbert Lütkenhaus provided the theoretical limit of the attack under turbulence.
A widely studied implementation of QKD utilizes free-space communication between
two parties (Alice and Bob) through the atmosphere [159, 37, 119, 111, 81, 124, 172], which
allows for long distance point-to-point links on the order of a hundred kilometers. This
communication distance can be extended even further to the global scale by introducing
satellite-based QKD systems [158, 15, 173, 124, 81, 172, 161, 21]. However, free-space
communication can be vulnerable to an eavesdropper attack, such as when Eve precisely
controls the incidence angle of an attack laser directed at Bob’s QKD receiver. Directing
a laser in this way can induce a change in the measurement efficiencies of one (or more)
detection channels, which enables Eve to do an intercept-resend (IR) attack that may
compromise the system’s security [135, 127].
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The success of this spatial mode attack depends on the eavesdropper’s ability to pre-
cisely maintain specific beam angles to a free-space QKD receiver, which attacks different
detection channels. Atmospheric turbulence could compromise or even prevent such an
attack as turbulence causes a beam to randomly wander along its trajectory, as well as
inducing various optical aberrations such as astigmatism, defocus, coma, etc. Stronger
turbulence conditions result in a larger variance in the amount of beam wander [157].
Consideration of these physical limitations on Eve is not usually included in the theoreti-
cal security analysis of a system, but can be useful to verify whether an attack is feasible
under more realistic conditions.
In this study, we experimentally determine the minimum strength of atmospheric tur-
bulence that could prevent a successful attack on our free-space polarization-based QKD
receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence using a phase-only spatial-light modulator
(SLM). Since there are limitations on how well adaptive optics can correct for turbulence,
our work explores to what level Eve must correct her attack beam to still be successful
[80, 78]. We assume that the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) only monitor the total
count rates (as opposed to the rates of individual channels), and that they use a non-decoy
state BB84 protocol [13]. We also assume that Eve has access to a weak coherent pulse
source and state of the art photo-detectors, and does not have a quantum repeater. Fur-
thermore, we assume that Eve cannot replace the quantum channel with a lossless channel.
We find that an attack on our free-space receiver could still succeed if Eve can correct the
tip-tilt mode for turbulence as strong as r0 = 1.53 cm (assuming an initial beam diameter
of 20 cm), where r0 is the atmospheric coherence length. This result defines an “unsafe
radius” of 543 m around Bob’s receiver in typical sea-level turbulence conditions where
Eve’s attack could be successful if done within this radius.
First we discuss our SLM setup used to emulate atmospheric turbulence, and how we
verified its accuracy and reproducibility in Section 6.2.1. Then we describe the components
and operation of our free-space polarization-based QKD receiver under test in Section 6.2.2.
In Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4, we discuss the results from spatial mode attacks performed in
various turbulence strengths, following a similar procedure to Sajeed et al. in Ref. [135].
Finally, in Section 6.2.5 we discuss an entanglement breaking scheme proposed by Zhang
et al. in Ref. [174], to theoretically verify if there exists an attack strategy for Eve, even if
Alice and Bob know about their detection efficiency mismatch, and monitor the statistics
of all possible detection outcomes. We conclude in Section 6.4.4.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison between measured and theoretical far-field intensity distributions
of a laser beam corresponding to one of 29 SLM phase holograms per turbulence strength
(r0) for a beam with D = 20 cm and λ = 532 nm. The greyscale in the holograms
represents a 0 to 2π phase range. The results show our SLM setup accurately emulates a









































Figure 6.9: Turbulence emulator characterization for r0 = 1.00 cm, D = 20 cm, and
λ = 532 nm. (a) Simulated centroid displacements corresponding to 500 phase holograms
(σ is the 2-axis standard deviation). The diameter of each data point is proportional
to the count frequency. The centroid displacement distribution is normally distributed
along both axes in agreement with Eq. (6.3). (b) Comparison between measured and
simulated centroid displacements for a subset of 29 holograms. This subset was chosen
to represent the normal statistical distribution of the 500-hologram set. The measured
values are within error of most theoretical predictions (error bars for measured data are
represented by diameter of data points). (c) Phase hologram and (d) far-field intensity
distribution corresponding to one centroid data point.
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6.2.1 Turbulence emulator
We use a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) to emulate a turbulent QKD channel in
the lab. One advantage of using a SLM as opposed to performing the experiment outdoors
is the ability to generate a range of turbulence strengths, from weak upper atmosphere to
stronger sea-level conditions. In addition, by performing our experiment in a laboratory,
we are immune to the unpredictability of an outdoor environment, allowing us to repeat
the same attack angles on our free-space QKD receiver under reproducible turbulence
conditions.
Our model uses the ‘thin phase screen approximation’ which emulates turbulence using
a single random phase screen in the aperture of the receiver, as opposed to requiring
two holograms to model multiple parameters that incorporate both phase and amplitude
variations [133]. We assume that Eve’s laser can mimic the intensity variations caused by
turbulence (scintillation) [38]. Note that the absence of these fluctuations could arouse
Alice and Bob’s suspicion of an eavesdropper in the channel, although fluctuations on the
time scale of scintillation at a second or less are rarely monitored in practice.
In order to reproduce the random statistics of turbulence, we load a series of 29 phase
maps per turbulence strength on the SLM to distort the optical wavefront. The strength
of the turbulence is completely characterized by the ratio of the initial beam diameter, D,
to the atmospheric coherence length, r0; turbulence dominates over diffractive effects when
D/r0  1.
We generate our phase holograms based on the well-known Kolmogorov model [12]
that uses a weighted superposition of Zernike polynomials for the basis-set [114]. There
are several advantages to using Zernike polynomials to generate the holograms as their
weights can be analytically calculated based on the turbulence strength [17]. Furthermore,
Zernike polynomials directly relate to known optical aberrations, such as tip-tilt, defocus,
astigmatism, coma, etc. Therefore, it is straightforward to characterize the SLM’s ability
to reliably and precisely emulate atmospheric turbulence by comparing calculated Zernike
polynomial coefficients to those reconstructed by a measurement device, such as a wavefront
sensor.
The radial phase function φ(ρ, θ) that describes each hologram is given by a weighted
sum of several Zernike polynomials as φ(ρ, θ) =
∑
i ciZi, where Zi and ci are the Zernike
polynomial and corresponding coefficient for the ith polynomial, respectively, following the
Noll labelling convention and normalization constants [114]. We use 44 Zernike polynomials
to ensure a complex spatial structure that can accurately emulate a range of atmospheric
turbulence strengths.
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Based on the Kolmogorov model [12, 17], if we assume that the Zernike coefficients are
normally distributed with mean zero, then ci are random drawings from distributions with











where C2n is the refractive-index structure constant of the atmosphere, L is the path length
through the turbulent atmosphere that has a constant C2n, k = 2π/λ, λ is the laser wave-
length, and Γ is the Gamma function. The indices n and m are related to the Zernike
polynomial order following the Noll labelling convention, where n ≥ |m| and n−m is even
[114]. We note that the subscript “n” of C2n is not related to the index “n” used in the
Zernike polynomials, but instead to the refractive index of the atmosphere. A single value
of C2n is used when calculating σ
2
nm over each n and m indices for each atmospheric strength
modelled. A large C2n (small r0) value corresponds to stronger atmospheric turbulence. An
example of stronger turbulent conditions that could be found at sea level corresponds to
r0 = 1.00 cm over L = 1 km for D = 20 cm at λ = 532 nm, whereas weaker conditions at
high altitude corresponds to r0 = 7.00 cm [12].
Since Zernike polynomials directly relate to known optical aberrations, we can use
simple equations and measurement devices (CCD camera and wavefront sensor), to in-
dependently verify and characterize our turbulence emulator. Figure 6.8 shows both the
simulated and measured far-field intensity distributions of a beam after its wavefront has
been distorted by the SLM hologram. Each hologram shown is one example from a set of 29
holograms per r0 value used to emulate how different strengths of turbulence would affect
a 20 cm beam at 532 nm. We experimentally image the far-field by placing a camera in the
focal plane of a lens that is located one focal length from the SLM. This arrangement maps
the phase wavefront imprinted on the beam by the hologram into an intensity distribution
at the camera plane. Note that we include an additional x-grating in the hologram (not
shown for clarity) to spatially separate the first-order diffracted beam from the zeroth-
order, as only the first-order beam contains the pure phase wavefront. The zeroth-order
(and higher-order) diffracted beams were carefully blocked shortly after the SLM.
We also verify our turbulence emulator by examining the centroid deviations caused
by each hologram. This is an important characterization as beam displacements due to
turbulence could dominate Eve’s ability to repeatedly send a beam at precise angles to the
receiver. Beam wander is the strongest effect on average as the tip-tilt coefficients (n = 1,
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m = ±1) have the largest weights overall [I11 = 0.45 from Eq. (6.2)], whereas defocus
(I20 = 0.02) and astigmatism (I22 = 0.02) have a smaller contribution on average. Higher
order aberrations can also cause centroid displacement, especially in the case of stronger
turbulence.
There is a direct relationship between the tilt angle variance of centroid displacement










Since this equation is independent of the method used to emulate turbulence, we can verify
whether the 29 chosen phase holograms accurately portray the statistics of atmospheric
turbulence both theoretically via computer simulations of far-field intensity distributions,
and experimentally through our SLM setup. This independent verification ensures that
the holograms are accurate, as well as that the SLM is correctly imprinting the phase mask
onto the beam.
The centroid displacement data presented in Fig. 6.9 corresponds to low-altitude sea
level turbulence (r0 = 1.00 cm for a 20 cm beam). The simulated centroid displacements
from 500 holograms are shown in Fig. 6.9(a). Each data point corresponds to a unique
hologram [Fig. 6.9(c)] and far-field intensity distribution [Fig. 6.9(d)]. The simulated cen-
troids follow a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation σ that is in agreement
with Eq. (6.3). These results confirm that the phase holograms we calculated properly
emulate the statistics of low-altitude sea level turbulence, irrespective of the SLM setup.
Similar tests were performed to verify the sets of holograms for each r0 value tested in this
experiment.
We compare simulated and measured centroid displacements of 29 holograms per r0
strength in Fig. 6.9(b). The number of holograms used in the hacking experiment were
limited to reduce data acquisition time and stability issues while scanning. Therefore, we
chose 29 holograms from a larger distribution of 500 to emulate each r0 strength. The holo-
grams were chosen based on their centroid displacements being approximately 0.5σ, σ, 2σ
and 3σ from the origin [along the dashed circles outlined in Figs. 6.9(a) and 6.9(b)], along
with one histogram with no turbulence representing 0σ. The centroid results, along with
the qualitative comparison between theoretical and measured far-field intensity distribu-
tions (Fig. 6.8), confirmed we had excellent agreement between theory and experiment for
turbulence emulated by our SLM setup. The 29th hologram always emulates 0σ displace-
ment with no turbulence. The contribution of each of the 29 holograms to the emulated
turbulence in subsequent experiments is weighted by its probability of occurrence, which
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follows a Gaussian distribution. This probability of occurrence is a definite integral of
normalized Gaussian distribution over the annulus formed by the adjacent radii shown
in Fig. 6.9(b). We refer to each annulus by the name of its inner radius, near which its
holograms are located. The 0σ annulus, extending from 0 (where its hologram is located)
to 0.5σ radius, has the weight of 0.1175. The 0.5σ annulus has the weight of 0.2760, 1σ of
0.4712, 2σ of 0.1242, and 3σ (extending to infinity) has the weight of 0.0111.
6.2.2 Test setup for QKD system
We use our turbulence emulator to study the effect of turbulence on free-space detec-
tion efficiency mismatch. Eve’s experimental setup consists of two parts: the turbulence
emulator (SLM) and the beam scanning unit, as shown in Fig. 6.16. Our source is a
532 nm continuous-wave laser that is first sent through a polarization beam splitter PBSE
(Thorlabs CCM1-PBS251) to transmit only horizontally-polarized light to the SLM, which
ensures phase-only modulation. The beam’s wavefront after the SLM represents propa-
gation through atmospheric turbulence of a particular strength. We use a quarter-wave
plate QWPE (Thorlabs AQWP10M-600) to rotate horizontal light to circularly polarized
to equalize the QKD receiver detector signals on the four polarization channels. Eve’s scan-
ning lens LE is mounted on a two-axis motorized translation stage (Thorlabs MAX343/M),
which scans the attack beam’s angle. A half-wave plate HWPE (Thorlabs AHWP10M-600)
and neutral density filter NDE (Thorlabs ND30A) are used to control Eve’s intensity. Fi-
nally, the receiver is placed 13 m away from LE.
The QKD receiver under test is a prototype for a quantum communication satellite
[15], which uses a passive basis choice to detect polarization-encoded light. Its telescope
consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter of 50 mm with a focal length f = 250 mm;
Thorlabs AC508-250-A), and a collimating lens L2 (diameter of 5 mm with f = 11 mm;
Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated beam of . 2 mm diameter then passes through a
50:50 beam splitter BS (custom pentaprism [15]), and a pair of polarization beam splitters
PBS1 and PBS2 (Thorlabs PBS121). The purpose of PBS2 is to increase the polarization
extinction ratio in the reflected path from PBS1. The four lenses L3 (Thorlabs PAF-X-18-
PC-A) focus the beams into four multi-mode fibers, each with a core diameter of 105 µ m
(Thorlabs M43L01), which are connected to single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-
AQRH-12-FC). We use one set of polarization optics and detectors to measure diagonal
D and anti-diagonal A polarizations by rotating them 45 degree relative to the horizontal
H and vertical V polarization detectors. We note that this receiver under test does not




































Figure 6.10: Scanning setup. (a) Experimental setup of our spatial mode attack in a
turbulent channel, top view (drawing not to scale). The green central ray that is parallel
to the optical axis denotes normal alignment of Alice’s beam into Bob’s receiver. The red
rays show the optical path of Eve’s scanning beam when tilted at an angle (θ, φ) via lens
LE. CW: continuous-wave; HWP: half-wave plate; QWP: quarter-wave plate; BS: beam
splitter; PBS: polarization beam splitter; ND: neutral density filter; SLM: spatial light
modulator; L: lens. (b) Photograph of the actual free-space QKD receiver for detecting
polarization-encoded light.
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(b) r0 = 7.00 cm
(c) r0 = 3.50 cm
(e) r0 = 1.53 cm


















(d) r0 = 2.21 cm
φ (mrad)
Figure 6.11: Normalized count rates τk for each detector k = H,V,D, or A at different
incoming beam angles (θ, φ), and the corresponding attack angles for different turbulence
strengths r0. The attack angles for the four polarization detectors are shown left to right
as horizontal H (yellow), vertical V (red), diagonal D (green), and anti-diagonal A (light
blue). The emulated turbulence corresponds to different r0 values for an initial beam
diameter D = 20 cm and λ = 532 nm. A smaller r0 value corresponds to stronger
atmospheric turbulence.
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6.2.3 Attack using Spatial mode detection efficiency mismatch
This study assumes that Alice and Bob generate a secret key using a non-decoy state
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [13]. We also make the weaker assumption pre-
sented in Ref. [135] that they only monitor the total detection rate for evidence of Eve’s
attack rather than the counts of each channel. Additionally, we assume Alice and Bob also
monitor only the average error rate over the four channels, and terminate the protocol if
the average quantum bit error rate (QBER) over the four channels is higher than a 8%
threshold [138].
The attack model we consider is an intercept-resend attack called the faked-state at-
tack [97, 98]. In this attack, Eve attempts to deterministically control Bob’s basis choice
and detection outcomes without terminating the protocol. To achieve this, Eve needs to
maintain the expected detection rate between Alice and Bob, and keep the QBER below
the termination threshold during her attack. In our practical attack model, we assume that
Eve knows the attack angles for each polarization state, as well as the detection efficiency
ratios between the detectors. Eve intercepts signals sent by Alice using an active basis
choice receiver and superconducting nanowire detectors with an overall detection efficiency
of 85%. This interception could be done right in front of Alice’s setup, to negate the turbu-
lence effect on Eve’s measurement. She then generates a signal with the same polarization
state as her measurement result, and sends it to Bob at the ideal attack angle. These fake
signals may suffer from atmospheric turbulence in transmission to Bob.
We assume that Eve is restricted to today’s technology, and uses a weak coherent state
for her resend signal. Thus, Eve can control the mean photon number µ of her pulses, as
well as mimic scintillation caused by turbulence in the free-space channel to avoid arousing
suspicion. Several free-space QKD systems employ pointing and tracking systems that use
a bright beacon source and wave front sensor [16, 124, 172] which could be adapted by
Bob to monitor and correct beam wander. However, this pointing system uses a separate
beacon laser at a different wavelength. This beacon laser does not need to be tampered
with by Eve, and the pointing is unaffected by her attack. In the worst case, Eve could
perform an intercept-and-resend attack on the beacon beam such that Bob’s receiver is
pointed according to her designated direction. Thus, this pointing and correction system
cannot prevent the attack in our model.
To verify the possibility of a successful attack, we use an optimization program to find
the mean photon number that Eve should use for each attack angle to match Bob’s expected
total detection probability while minimizing the QBER. Our detailed attack model and
the optimization process are explained in Ref. [135].
We first characterize a spatial mode attack for a channel without turbulence (r0 =∞)
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before considering a turbulent channel. The optical alignment between the sender (Alice)
and the receiver (Bob) is optimized by equalizing the detection count rates of the four po-
larization channels for a beam propagating through the center of the scanning lens LE [i.e.,
along the green center ray shown in Fig. 6.16(a)]. This initial alignment represents normal
operation which has a scanning angle φ = θ = 0. We then move the two-axis translation
stage to adjust the position of lens LE, and record the four detection efficiencies (H, V,
D, and A) for different angles (θ, φ). In principle, the tip-tilt angles induced on the beam
by the scanning lens are equivalent to including additional Zernike polynomial terms in
the SLM hologram. Furthermore, the order in which the different Zernike polynomials
are applied to the beam is interchangeable. As a result, our configuration of having the
scanning lens follow the SLM is equivalent to Eve first steering the beam before it propa-
gates through atmospheric turbulence. The scan is performed in 135 µ rad steps, covering
a range of ±2.7 mrad, which corresponds to a lateral displacement of ±35 mm along the
front lens L1 of the QKD receiver.
In order for an angle to be a valid attack angle for channel k (k = H,V,D, or A), it
must satisfy the condition that the probability of detection in channel k is δk times greater
than the detection probabilities of the two channels in the other basis. For example, if
k = H, then min{τH/τD, τH/τA} > δH , where τk is the normalized detection probability
defined as the ratio between the detection rate at the attack angle over the expected
detection probability of Bob. We continuously increase the threshold δk until only a few
attack angles satisfy these conditions. From the attacker’s point of view, it is desirable to
have δk as large as possible because a large value means an increased chance that detector
k will click while minimizing the detection probabilities of the two other channels, which
improves Eve’s knowledge of Alice’s state.
The scan results without turbulence (r0 = ∞) for the four polarization channels are
shown in Fig. 6.15(a), and the corresponding detection efficiency mismatch parameters are
listed in Table 6.2. There are noticeable features that cause efficiency mismatch, such as
the side peak visible below the center peak in H detector’s map, and the outer ring in
all four detector maps. The valid attack angles for the H detector correspond to when
the click probability is 22 times higher than D and A detectors (i.e., δH = 22), and the
normalized detection probability τH = 0.1. Although the mismatch ratios on D (δD = 5)
and A (δA = 1.2) channels are small, the mismatch in H and V (δV = 30) channels are
sufficient for a successful attack under our assumption that Alice and Bob only monitor
the total count rate (not individual channels).
The optimized QBER as a function of transmission loss between Alice and Bob for
a channel without turbulence is shown in Fig. 6.12. In a practical scenario, Alice and
Bob might experience transmission efficiency fluctuations in their quantum channel. As a
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Table 6.2: Detection efficiency mismatch parameters for attack data shown in Figs. 6.12
and 6.15. τk is the relative detection efficiency at an attack angle compared to the normal
incidence case, and varies for different turbulence strengths due to changes in the scanning
features that lead to valid attack angles. The value of the threshold of detection efficiency
ratio δk decreases under stronger turbulence. If the δk are too low, it is impossible for Eve
to find an optimal mean photon number for her resend signal that matches Bob’s expected
detection rate and does not induce error above the termination threshold. * denotes the
turbulence strengths where an attack is not feasible.
r0 (cm)
δk τk
H V D A H V D A
∞ 22 30 5.0 1.2 0.1 0.03 0.3 0.001
7.00 20 5.0 1.03 3.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7
3.50 8.0 2.5 1.08 2.3 0.5 0.15 0.85 0.5
2.21 4.5 1.8 1.15 2.21 0.4 0.2 0.85 0.2
1.53 3.0 2.0 1.7 1.25 0.45 0.3 0.85 0.02
1.00* 1.2 1.7 1.02 1.01 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.15
result, they need to tolerate some deviation in their key rate from their estimated value.
The results shown in Fig. 6.12 is the QBER during Eve’s attack as a function of the lowest
transmission loss acceptable to Alice and Bob. In the next section, we examine the success
of Eve’s attack in the presence of turbulence.
6.2.4 Practical attack under turbulence
To simulate our attack in the presence of atmospheric turbulence, we use a set of 29
holograms per turbulence strength, as described in Sec. II. We have performed scans of
our QKD receiver for five different turbulence strengths: r0 = 7.00, 3.50, 2.21, 1.53, and
1.00 cm. Our preliminary experiments that included tip-tilt wander caused by turbulence
(i.e., the second and third terms of Zernike polynomials) showed that if Eve does not correct
for beam wander caused by turbulence, her attack is not feasible even under very weak
turbulence (r0 = 7.00 cm) corresponding to typical high-altitude atmospheric conditions.
The beam wander from tip-tilt alone was a strong enough disturbance to significantly
hinder her attack. We then repeated the attack under the assumption that Eve can correct
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Figure 6.12: Modeled attack performance. Quantum bit error rate (QBER) as a function
of transmission loss for no turbulence (blue solid line) and different turbulence strengths
corresponding to r0 = 7.00 cm (pink dashed line), 3.50 cm (green dotted line), 2.21 cm (red
dot-dash line), 1.53 cm (black dashed line), 1.00 cm (cyan dashed line). The horizontal
grey dashed line denotes the 8% threshold where Eve’s attack is successful when QBER is
below this value in our attack model. The maximum transmission loss where Eve’s attack
is successful decreases as turbulence strength increases. The mismatch ratios are too small
in the case of 1.00 cm (δk ≤ 2 for all channels), and the optimization program could not
find a solution with a QBER below 8% threshold given any transmission loss. The higher
QBER at low loss (i.e., 3.5–7 dB) is because Eve has to send higher mean photon number
states for channels with lower δk in order to match expected detection rate of Bob.
for tip-tilt beam wander using adaptive optics, such as with a deformable mirror or SLM.
These corrections are implemented in our scans by setting the weight of the second and
third terms of Zernike polynomials to zero.
In order to maintain accuracy and stability in our scans, we have chosen to cycle
through all 29 holograms at one lens position before moving the translation stage to the
next position. This method ensures each hologram is applied to the same scanning angle.
We then repeat this scanning process for a total of 1681 angle positions, and record 29
separate detection rates per attack angle for each of the four polarization channels. To
represent the Gaussian distribution of centroid displacements discussed in Section 6.2.1,
the final normalized detection efficiency of each detector τk is given by a weighted average





where τk,i is average detection efficiency of k detector under the holograms selected from
ith radius. Φi is probability of occurrence of ith partition discussed in Section 6.2.1. N = 5
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is the number of partitions. We select 1 sample hologram for no turbulence, 8 samples each
for 0.5σ, 1σ, 2σ partition, and 4 samples from 3σ partition. The samples are given the
weight factor corresponding to the radius from the sample used to the next larger sample,
thus representing the best case hologram from this range. This weight factor ensures that
the samples form an optimistic (easier to hack) representation of the turbulence effect, and
therefore ensure any turbulence found to not be vulnerable to attacks is indeed safe under
the parameter monitoring assumptions. The total detection rate τk is used to find valid
attack angles under turbulent conditions using the same method as without turbulence. We
then repeat this process for different turbulence strengths from very weak (r0 = 7.00 cm)
to stronger turbulence emulating low-altitude sea level conditions (r0 = 1.00 cm). A map
of successful attack angles and the corresponding detection efficiency mismatch parameters
are shown in Fig. 6.15(b)–(f) and Table 6.2.
Our scanning results in Table 6.2 show that as the turbulence strength increases, the
mismatch ratios δk are significantly reduced. We can see in Fig. 6.15 that the features
that are responsible for efficiency mismatch become blurry and eventually disappear as
turbulence increases in strength, and it becomes harder for Eve to maintain a precise attack
angle when r0 ≤ 1.53 cm. For stronger turbulence (r0 = 1.00 cm), the only remaining
hackable feature is the displacement of the center peaks due to a slight misalignment
between the fiber couplers in each arm of the receiver. As a result, most of the attack
angles at stronger turbulence are found closer to the center peak. However, they do not
result in a successful attack for r0 < 1.53 cm because the induced QBER is above the 8%
termination threshold.
In order to perform a quantitative verification of an attack, we use an optimization
program to find the minimal QBER as a function of transmission loss. The results in
Fig. 6.12 show the optimized QBER for an attack in stronger turbulence (r0 = 2.21 cm)
is higher than that of weaker turbulence (r0 = 7.00 cm). If we assume that the QBER
threshold for Alice and Bob to terminate the protocol is 8 %, then the attack without
turbulence is successful as long as the transmission loss between Alice and Bob is less than
21 dB. Whereas in the presence of turbulence, Eve can successfully attack this receiver for
r0 ≥ 2.21 cm when the transmission loss is less than 10 dB but higher than 7 dB. Using
Eq. (6.2), r0 = 2.21 cm is equivalent to Eve having her resend setup approximately 0.5 km
away from Bob’s receiver in typical sea-level turbulence conditions (C2n = 1.8×10−14 m−2/3).
Eve is unable to match Bob’s count rate for transmission loss below 3.5 dB even if she uses
all four channels due to Eve’s non-perfect detection efficiency. Therefore, the optimization
program could not find a solution matching Bob’s total detection rates for transmission
losses below 3.5 dB.
The result for r0 = 1.53 cm shows there is only a small loss window (around 8.5 dB)
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where Eve can attack without inducing a QBER higher than the threshold. Using Eq. (6.2)
and the value of C2n given above, this r0 corresponds to a distance of 1 km. At lower
transmission loss (i.e., 3.5–7 dB), the expected detection rate at Bob is too high for Eve
to match using a single channel, and therefore she must also use the other channels that
have a lower δk. This causes the QBER to increase and results in the irregularities seen for
loss below 7 dB when the number of channels being used is changed. The QBER curves
become smoother at higher loss once Eve can fully replicate Bob’s detection rates while
only sending signals to a single polarization channel, which takes advantage of the greatest
efficiency mismatch for an optimized attack. The mismatch ratios in the case of 1.00 cm
(δk ≤ 2 for all channels) are too small for the optimization program to find a solution for
a QBER below the threshold given any transmission loss.
Implementations of QKD can and should monitor counts at each detector to ensure they
remain relatively balanced. The higher QBER obtained when Eve is forced to send states to
channels with lower mismatch ratios illustrates how monitoring each channel would increase
the difficulty of a successful attack. However, it is uncommon in practice to monitor
individual count rates, and there are no current standards or established guidelines for
allowable variation in detection rates. The added constraint to maintain precise detection
rates would make hacking more difficult for an eavesdropper, but does not in itself prevent
an attack. It also does not invalidate the current work of determining if bounds exist on
the turbulence strength where QKD systems can be hacked.
6.2.5 Theoretical limit of attack under turbulence
The attack described in Section 6.4.3 is only one particular example of an intercept-resend
attack. Other attacks in this class may exist which shows that a QKD system with detection
efficiency mismatch could be insecure if the security analysis does not take the mismatch
into account. Whenever the observed and monitored data are compatible with an IR
attack, no secret key can be obtained [27, 26].
For this reason, it is useful to ask the question whether the data we observe is consistent
with an IR attack or not. Along the way we can also answer the question whether a fine-
grained analysis of the observations could exclude IR attacks, and thus potentially give
a secure key where the coarse-grained analysis (which uses only average error rate and
average detection rate) fails.
The handle to determine whether given data are compatible with an IR attack or
not is the fact that IR attacks make the channel between Alice and Bob entanglement
breaking. That is, this channel acting as one system of a bipartite entangled state will
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transform it into a separable bipartite state. So by verifying that the channel is not
entanglement breaking, we can exclude the IR attacks. To do so, we do not require actual
entanglement: we can probe the channel with non-orthogonal signal states, just as in
any prepare-and-measure QKD set-up, and use the formalism of the source-replacement
scheme (see for example [39]) to formulate an equivalent thought set-up that virtually
uses an entangled state. The probabilities p(ab|xy) between Alice’s signal choice a and
Bob’s measurement result b for respective basis choices x and y can then be thought of as
coming from measurements on this entangled state with both Alice and Bob performing
measurements with POVM elements Mx,aA and M
y,b
B , respectively. If these observations
serve as an entanglement witness, we have shown that the channel is not entanglement
breaking.
We can formulate the entanglement verification problem as the optimization problem
find ρAB





B ) = p(ab|xy),∀a, b, xy.
(6.5)
Here ΓA is the partial transpose operation on Alice’s system. If the above optimization
problem is not feasible, then the state ρAB is entangled [120]. In our previous work [174], we
developed a method to solve the above optimization problem when detectors’ efficiencies
are mismatched and the dimension of the optical signal is unbounded.
In this work, we did not measure the joint distribution p(ab|xy) of Alice and Bob
directly in the experiment. However, given the characterization of detection efficiency
mismatch from our experiment, we can deduce the joint distribution of Alice and Bob
from the case without efficiency mismatch according to our simulation model. Using the
method developed in Ref. [174], we found that when there is no turbulence or very weak
turbulence r0 = 7.00 cm, we cannot verify entanglement. Thus, the channel is vulnerable.
This result is in agreement with the results in Ref. [174].
However, when turbulence is stronger (r0 ≤ 3.50 cm), our calculation shows that entan-
glement can be verified. This means that there is no intercept-resend strategy for Eve that
can match all of Alice and Bob’s expected observations. This result is based on a strong
condition where Eve needs to match all expected measurable parameters of Alice and Bob.
Whereas, the results presented in Section 6.4.3 were under the practical assumptions that




We experimentally study how atmospheric turbulence in a free-space channel can affect
an eavesdropper’s ability to perform a spatial mode attack on a QKD receiver. We use
a phase-only spatial light modulator to emulate atmospheric turbulence in the lab, whose
accuracy is verified by comparing measured far-field intensity distributions and centroid
displacements to theoretical predictions. We then study a spatial mode detection efficiency
mismatch attack under a range of atmospheric turbulence strengths to determine the max-
imum unsafe radius around the free-space QKD receiver. Our attack model is based on an
intercept-resend attack under the practical assumptions that only the total detection rate
and QBER are monitored by Alice and Bob. We find that for this particular receiver, an
eavesdropper could attack a non-decoy state BB84 system from up to about 1 km away
in typical sea-level turbulence conditions (r0 = 1.53 cm for a 20 cm beam at 532 nm).
This result is assuming Eve can correct for basic tip-tilt beam wander using conventional
adaptive optics. Eve’s chances of success will be further reduced if Alice and Bob choose
to monitor individual detection channel statistics. In this case, we theoretically find that
an IR attack is still possible for weaker turbulence (r0 ≥ 7.0 cm). The assumption that an
eavesdropper has physical limitations is not usually included in the security analysis of a
QKD system. If there is a chance that Eve is inside this secure zone around Bob’s receiver,
or has advanced adaptive optics capacities to correct for beam aberrations, then extra care
regarding these types of attacks may be required.
6.3 Spatial-mode response characterization in a free-
space QKD system with Zernike polynomials
Author contributions
Vadim Makarov, Norbert Lütkenhaus, and Thomas Jennewein provided advice on the
experimental setup. Katanya B. Kuntz wrote a program to generate phase hologram
for the SLM. I wrote programs to control and synchronize the experiment setup. With
Katanya B. Kuntz and Jean Philippe Bourgoin, we performed an experiment and verified
the countermeasures. With Katanya B. Kuntz, we process the experiment result and
analyze the practical limit of the attack.
Unlike eavesdropper Eve, whose ability is limited only by laws of physics, the legitimate
parties in the QKD scheme are limited by both available knowledges as well as equipment
and technology. As the understanding of the subject and better tools being developed, it is
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equally important to revisit and verify the effectiveness of countermeasure implementation
against the attack it is designed to counter, as well as other variants.
Our previous study [135] shows that by altering the angle of the signal sent to Bob, Eve
could bias the detection probability in a free-space QKD receiver, enabling intercept and
resend attack. A spatial filter (pinhole) was proposed as a countermeasure. In this study,
we propose a more general method of characterizing the spatial-mode detection efficiency
mismatch in a free-space QKD system using a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM).
Our experiments are divided into two parts: first in Section 6.3.1, we characterize the
detection efficiency mismatch apparatus with SLM and explore the effect of higher-order
Zernike polynomials on detection efficiency mismatch. In Section 6.3.2, we verify the
effectiveness of the spatial filter against both original tip-tilt as well as using more complex
wavefront intensity distributions generated by the SLM.
6.3.1 Zernike poynomials and SLM characterization
In this study, we use a phase-only Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) to manipulate the
phase wavefront of the attack beam. The wavefront consists of a combination of Zernike
polynomials [12, 17]. Each Zernike polynomial represents a different optical aberration,
such as defocusing, tip-tilt, astigmatism, coma, etc. In principle, phase hologram generated





where Zi is the ith Zernike polynomial and ci are weighing, could produce arbitrary wave-
front intensity distribution out of a characterized incidence beam reflected from the SLM.
The receiver we test is a prototype for a quantum communication satellite [15] with
polarization encoding. It is a passive basis choice receiver operating at 532 nm wave-
length. In this type of receiver, the input light is split by a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) and
polarizing beamsplitters (PBS) into four multimode fibers leading to four single-photon
detectors. The detectors receive photons polarized horizontally H, vertically V, +45 deg
D and −45 deg A. The efficiency mismatch ratio (δk) means that a detector in channel
k ⊂ H, V,D,A has a probability of clicking at least δk times higher than the detectors in
the other basis. We replace the mechanical scanning apparatus in Ref. [135] with SLM,
as shown in Fig. 6.16. To verify the ability of the SLM to modulate wavefront intensity,
we projected the hologram between z4 − z10. The far-field intensity distribution of the re-












































Figure 6.13: (a)Experimental setup, and (b)Picture of receiver under test.
propagation path. The measurement results in all distance closely resemble the theoretical
simulation, as shown in Fig. 6.14.
6.3.2 Generalized spatial-mode detection efficiency mismatch char-
acterization
In addition to flexibility, the SLM also provides better precision and stability over the
mechanical scanning setup. It also eliminates distortion caused by tilting the scanning
lens. This new setup could reveal some exploitable features obscured in the mechanical
scanning setup.
The experiment is done by sending circularly polarized light from the source with the
wavefront controlled by weight terms zi of the hologram on the SLM. The goal here is to
find a combination of zi that causes the highest δk for each k channel. Limited by the
stability of the setup, it is impossible to measure all combinations of Zernike polynomial
terms and weigh values. Our first task is to narrow down this parameter space. For
that, we need to look for specific polynomial zi that contributes to the detection efficiency
mismatch. We generated 1000 holograms with a random weight value of z4 − z20 (tip-tilt
modes are excluded). The range of weight value ci in this study is bounded by the SLM
pixelate to ±20 for Z2 and Z3 (tip-tilt), and ±8 for higher-order Zi.
We project these randomly generated histograms one-by-one on the SLM and record
detection efficiency mismatch ratio δk. The result shows that, of all the holograms that
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Figure 6.14: Far-field characterization of wavefront intensity generated by Zernike polyno-
mials in the setup. The measurement result agreed with the simulation throughout beam
propagation path.
cause mismatch ratio higher than 5 (the minimum ratio that Eve could exploit [135]),
only z4 to z7 have a noticeable higher impact. Thus, in the following experiments, we will
consider only the effect of z2 − z7.
Our test of tip-tilt (z2, z3) scanning shows similar result to [135] (see Fig. 6.15 (a)). This
tip-tilt-only case gave δk varying between 1.5–17.7 as shown in Table 6.3. We also perform
another scan without tip-tilt modes, the higher-order scan of Z4 − Z7 showed values of δk
varying between 1.3–4.7, which is not high enough for Eve to exploit.
However, when we fixed the weight of z2 and z3 to the value that causes highest effi-
ciency mismatch in the tip-tilt-only case, then scan the weight value of z4 − z7 and record
the combinations that cause the highest mismatch, the results show that Eve can sig-
nificantly increase the highest mismatch ratio from 17.7 to 52.3 (See the last column of
Table 6.3). The results in this section show the significance of including higher spatial-
mode in the characterization of free-space QKD systems. Furthermore, if one were to use
SLM and Zernike polynomials to actively correct spatial mode distortion either by Eve
or environment such as atmospheric turbulence, and if the detection efficiency mismatch
is concerned, one can narrow-down their calculation to z2 − z7. This would significantly
improve calculation speed.
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Figure 6.15: Tip-tilt scanning result shows normalized detection probability of each de-
tector at different incoming beam angle in mrad on three different scenarios; (a) without
pinhole, (b) with pinhole, and (c) with pinhole and diaphragm.
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Table 6.3: Maximaum detection efficiency mismatch in each receiver channel. The result
shows that, with the help of higher order Zernike polynomials, the detection efficiency





z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 Tip-tilt only
With higher order
polynomials
H -4 8 4 6 4 -4 1.5 2.2
V -8 3 0 0 0 0 17.7 17.7
D 12 8 -6 8 -4 0 7.7 52.3
A 10 11 -2 -2 2 6 1.4 1.7
6.3.3 Countermeasure verification
In this section, we use the setup to verify the effectiveness of the spatial filter (25 µm
pinhole) as a countermeasure to spatial mode attack. The result in Fig. 6.15 (b) shows
that the pinhole can only block the translational modes and small-angle reflection from
beamsplitters. However, it could not reliably block high-angle trajectory (i.e. lens edge
scattering). Furthermore, it opens a new attack for different combinations of Zernike
polynomials weights, which increases the mismatch ratio in this case to 15.0. This ratio is
exploitable by Eve(See Table 6.4). This feature could not be seen in the mechanical scan
experiment. To counter high-angle scattering, we add a diaphragm behind the collimating
lens (L2) in the receiver. This diaphragm alone helps block the higher-angle scattering
features, as shown in Fig. 6.15 (d). The result in Fig. 6.15 (d) shows that diaphragm and
pinhole together help prevent most of the efficiency mismatch from the tip-tilt mode. The
only feature left is the translational shift of fiber coupler, which causes a mismatch angle
close to the original beam path in channel H (δH = 4.5) and channel V (δV = 15.9), worsen
the situation. However, when the diaphragm’s diameter is reduced to 4mm, all exploitable
features are blocked, and no combination of weight values within our scanning range cause
detection efficiency mismatch.
These series of experiments provides two valuable insight. First, any system characteri-
zation methods and countermeasures need to be revisited as new techniques and equipment
developed. In our case, the tip-tilt only characterization is not sufficient to guarantee the
countermeasure’s effectiveness, and the SLM helps reveals new preventable vulnerabilities.
Second, new countermeasures which parameter is not set properly, diaphragm diameter in
this case, could change the outcome from successfully preventing the attack from opening
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Table 6.4: Efficiency mismatch ratio and corresponding weight value of Zernike polynomial






Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7
No pinhole -8 2 4 4 4.7
Pinhole 8 0 8 4 15.0
Pinhole+diaphragm (7mm) -2 6 6 0 15.9
Pinhole+diaphragm (4mm) - - - - 1.0± 0.1
a new attack angle.
6.3.4 Conclusion
In this study, we present a new method to characterize the spatial-mode detection efficiency
mismatch using SLM. Characterization of spatial-mode detection efficiency mismatch using
an SLM helps reveal some exploitable features previously obscured. We show that by
including higher-order Zernike polynomials, Eve can increase detection efficiency mismatch.
We also show that diaphragm with a proper set diameter, in addition to a sufficiently
small pinhole proposed in previous studies, could prevent the efficiency mismatch due to
wavefront manipulation. These results are valid only within our experimental parameter
range
The exploitable features shown in this study demonstrates the importance of including
a tip-tilt scan while adjusting the alignment between Alice and Bob, as these features
could not be seen in the normal alignment procedure. Further study on characterization
and finding a better countermeasure against spatial-mode detection efficiency mismatch is
highly encouraged.
6.4 Faking photon number on transition-edge sensor
Author contributions
With Vadim Makarov, Anqi Huang, Hao Qin, we designed the experiment process. Jiaqiang
Zhong and Sheng-cai Shi provided the TES for the study. I performed an experiment with
Jiaqiang Zhong, Anqi Huang, and Hao Qin. With Vadim Makarov and Jiaqiang Zhong,
we post-process the data and design an attack model exploiting the vulnerability.
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Photon detectors are indispensable in quantum communication applications. To ensure
the reliability of the detection results, it is important to characterization of detectors being
used both within the intended working parameters and possible unintended conditions.
This characterization could help in revealing possible flaws and imperfections. These flaws
could lead to misguided detection results or worse exploitable vulnerabilities in the case of
quantum communication and cryptography applications. These characterizations of photon
detectors provide guides to improve the robustness of quantum systems. Over the years,
many studies have been reported with attacks on various types of photon detectors[97, 175,
135, 93, 91, 94, 92, 90, 44, 79].
TES is a photon detector capable of providing full photon-number-resolving (PNR)
capability [14, 35]. It also achieved the highest detection efficiency among PNR detectors
up to 95% for 1556-nm detection efficiency [82, 41, 107]. This type of detector is used
in various applications that require high detection probability, such as device-independent
quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) [47]. As one of the potential detectors in quantum
communication where the reliability of detection result affects overall security, the TES
photon detector should be investigated for its robustness and possible flaws. In this study,
we experimentally demonstrate two vulnerabilities of TES, namely, a wavelength attack
here the photon number result could be controlled by changing signal’s wavelength and a
faked-state attack where the adversary take control the temperature of TES with appropri-
ate bright CW-laser and force an arbitrary photon number detection result using a bright
pulsed laser. We also model an attack on a QKD system with TES as detectors based on
these characteristics.
The structure of this section is as follows. In Section 6.4.1, we present the device under
study and experimental setup. We then experimentally show the two methods of faking
photon number states in Section 6.4.2. To emphasize the threat of this attack, we use our
measurement results to model an attack on a QKD system in Section 6.4.3. We conclude
in Section 6.4.4.
6.4.1 Experimental setup
The operational description of TES has been discussed in chapter 3. Extremely sensitive
TES for photon detection operate below 1 K. The commercial SQUID amplifier chips
also work at low temperature, generally below 4 K. In our case, the TES and SQUID
are integrated onto a mounting copper block which is attached to the cold plate of an
adiabatic demagnetization refrigerator (ADR). Under the normal operational condition,










      BS
a)
b)









Figure 6.16: a) Internal circuit diagram of TES and DC-SQUID readout. b) Experimental
setup. Blinding and fake signal power is controlled by attenuator (Att). The input power
is measured by an optical power meter (PM).
of the TES. The TES bias is obtained by applying a constant current through a shunt
resistor (Rs). The changes of current resulted from the absorption of incident photons are
read by inducting coil coupling to the DC-SQUID. The magnetic field MFB produced by
the DC-SQUID inducing the output current IFB, which is further amplified by a current
amplifier G. The changing of output voltage VFB is proportional to the TES current change.
To test the response of the TES to various optical signals, we use the setup shown in
Fig. 6.16 b). The TES is fiber-coupled and designed for 1550 nm wavelength. [41, 42]
The photon coupling efficiency in the TES understudy is ≈ 1% owing to a misaligned
fiber end to the TES effective area. However, this does not affect our study. The faking
signal is coupled through the same path as the input signal. The blinding laser is added
by a beam splitter (BS). A power meter is used for monitoring the laser input power. A
function generator is used to product trigger pulses to synchronize the laser source and
signal recordings. Details of the operation will be explained in the respective sections.
The signal from TES is digitized by a data acquisition module (DAQ) and analyzed on a
computer(PC).
6.4.2 Fake detection on TES
In this section, we investigate two of the exploitable vulnerabilities of the TES detector
against two types of attack; wavelength attack and faked-state attack.
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Wavelength attack
TES’s output voltage is inherently proportional to the energy of photons absorbed. In
principle, N photons with a wavelength Nλ arriving simultaneously has the same photon
energy as one photon with a wavelength of λ. Thus TES would give the same output
between the detection of these two cases. With this fact, we show in the first experiment
that an attacker Eve could fake a single-photon detection result by sending multiple photons
with proportionally lower photon energy. To confirm this effect, weak-coherent signals from
several pulsed lasers of different wavelengths are sent through the input fiber of the TES.
We then record the voltage response VFB from the TES.
The histogram in Fig. 6.17 shows that the response signal of single-photon detection
from a 450 nm photon is overlapped with two-photons detection from 780 nm and three-
photons detection from 1550 nm photons. This result shows that a TES’s expected photon
number readout could be faked by multiple photons with a proportionally longer wave-
length. It shows that the photon number measurement results from a TES alone cannot
be used to characterize the photon number distribution of photon signal through an un-
trusted channel, e.g. QKD channel, where an adversary could intercept and replace the
signal with photons of arbitrary wavelength. A narrow-band wavelength filter could prevent
this attack. However, the characterization of the filter’s performance against exploitable
wavelengths for each specific filter is needed.
Faked-state attack
In the ideal condition, a TES operates at the transition edge between superconductor and
a normal resistor of a material. In this region, a small change of energy, such as single-
photon absorption, could induce a measurable change in output voltage proportional to
the energy absorbed. By setting a voltage threshold level for each input photon energy,
one could discriminate the number of absorbed photons. From the characteristic of TES
[61], a TES at a slightly higher temperature than the operational regime could produce
the same voltage output level when absorbing photons with much higher energy (bright
laser pulse). In this section, we experimentally demonstrate such behavior.
We first investigate the behavior of TES when its temperature is increased beyond the
designed transition-edge region. We set the TES to the operational temperature. We then
record the I-V characteristic curve of the system at different temperatures, which are a plot
of current across a superconducting material and the voltage readout from the DC-SQUID.
This characteristic curve will be used as a reference for the following experiments. At low
temperature (100− 150 mK), the output voltage of the DC-SQUID is reduced drastically
81






















Figure 6.17: Histogram of TES output voltage of weak-coherent laser pulses at 1550nm
(blue), 780nm (red), and 450nm (green). The leftmost peak represents zero-photon de-
tection. Subsequent peaks to the right represent higher photon number detection. These
peaks appear at the voltage level proportional to the energy of the photons.
as its input current increased. As the temperature of TES increasing, the I-V response
rate is decreased. Up to a certain threshold (≈ 180 mK), the voltage response turned to
be directly proportional to the current as the system becomes a normal resistor. This I-V
characteristics is shown in Fig. 6.18(a).
We now demonstrate the ability of an adversary to control the temperature using a
bright light. A tunable CW-laser at 1550nm is coupled through the input port of TES.
Fig. 6.18(b) shows that the I-V characteristics at different temperatures of the device under
test can be replicated. This result shows that an adversary could arbitrarily control the
temperature of TES using a bright CW-laser.
For the faked-state attack, the appropriate blinding laser power is one that puts the re-
sponse at the threshold between the transition-edge regime and the normal resistor regime.
In this region, the TES is ‘blinded’ from single-photon input as the change of voltage pro-
duce from single-photon absorption is minimal. At the same time, the system in this
condition could produce the same voltage level as the system at normal operating tem-
perature when absorbing a bright laser pulse. In this experiment, the blinding CW laser
is 0.25 nW. The fake photon-number response can then be forced by sending additional
bright pulsed laser with appropriate peak power. The histogram of faked-state results with
different peak power is shown in Fig. 6.19. Here, the fake signals are laser pulses with 16 ns
width and 100 kHz repetition rate. The result shows that an arbitrary ’photon number’
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Figure 6.18: I-V curves of the system. The characteristics of the system at 100 mK
under bright laser illumination (b) closely resemble the characteristics at different heat-
bath temperatures (a). This presents the ability of Eve to control TES’s temperature using
bright light through the input port.
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Figure 6.19: Fake detection histogram at different faked-state power.
response could be controlled by an outside adversary who has access to the input channel.
This vulnerability poses an immense threat to any communication system employing TES
as a detector.
6.4.3 Attack model
To emphasis the threat of vulnerabilities found in the previous section, we model a faked-
state attack [93] on a Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [13] QKD system, assuming it uses
the TES under test as its detectors. In this attack model, the adversary Eve intercepts
each signal from Alice and measures it on a random basis. She then reproduces a fake
signal identical to her detection result and sends it to Bob. Here, she also sends a CW
blinding laser power set to 0.25 nW and set her fake pulsed signal peak power to 0.48 pW.
In case of Bob’s measurement basis choice being different to that of Eve, the power of the
fake signal would be split equally between Bob’s detectors. As shown in Fig. 6.20, most
of the response signal from TES would fall below the single-photon detection threshold,
thus remain unregistered. Otherwise, if their basis choices matched, some of the signals
could be registered. It can be seen from the histogram in 6.20 that this attack condition
causes detection loss in Bob. In practice, Eve could hide this loss from Alice and Bob by
controlling her quantum channel loss. Thus, if the original quantum channel loss between
Alice and Bob is lower than the detection loss induced by Eve’s attack, this attack could
be done unnoticed. Our calculation shows that this attack on a QKD system with the TES
under test as detectors would induce 7.4% error rate. This error rate is lower than the
abort threshold of the BB84 protocol; thus, the security of the key could be compromised.
Similar attacks on other QKD protocols such as coherent-one-way (COW) [92] should also
be considered.
84
−20 0 20 40 60 80 100





















Figure 6.20: An attack model on a BB84 QKD system with TES as a detector. The
response under normal condition (black) contains a zero-photon response (left peak) and a
single-photon response (right peak). The threshold (green vertical dashed line) marks the
minimum TES voltage output that the system in our model would register as a detection.
The fake response is shown for two cases where Bob and Eve pick the same (red) and
different (blue) measurement bases.
6.4.4 Conclusion
We experimentally demonstrated two vulnerabilities of TES as a photon detector. In this
study, we showed an ability of Eve to fake photon-number results in TES using different
wavelengths. We also showed that the characteristics of TES could be altered by CW laser,
and photon-number detection results could be faked using laser pulses with appropriate
peak power. From the result, we showed an attack model on a BB84-QKD system with
TES as a detector and showed that Eve could perform intercept and resent attack while
inducing as low as 7.4 % error rate. Since the TES under test has a misalignment of its
input coupling, which limits its detection efficiency, we speculate that an attack on a TES
with a higher-efficiency detector with better energy resolution could yield a better result
for Eve. This, to our knowledge, is the first demonstration of potential vulnerabilities of
TES to hacking attacks. Countermeasures to such attacks will need to be considered in




In this thesis, I have shown six experiments that are examples of the method to improve the
performance and security of practical QKD implementations. In the first experiment on
the quantum dot as a single-photon source for QKD, we have seen that the development of
near-ideal single-photon source allows us to perform key exchange at a higher rate longer
distance, close to the theoretical limit. It also shows that QKD with a single-photon
source can be a candidate for long-distance QKD. The results also imply that other QKD
protocols with single-photon security analysis could benefit from employing a quantum
dot. In general, this study shows the necessity of exploring and evaluating all available
tools both in theory and practical implementation during the design stage of the QKD
system.
The second study on a generalization of device characterization against Trojan horse
attack. The result that the method being considered as a standard for QKD implementa-
tion could be improved to cover more powerful attacks allowed by the law of physics. It is
an example of the necessity to revisit and analyze the method and solution at hand from
a broader perspective, especially for the practices that would be included in the standard-
ization and certification criteria. To achieve the level of security promised in theory, we
should analyze the system design and practical devices based on what Eve could do, not
what she would do.
The third experiment on the backflash side-channel shows one of the vulnerabilities
in the detection devices. It shows that behavior that has been known for a long time in
the development of the device but has yet been analyzed and characterized within the
security model could hide a potential threat to the security of the system that employs
such a device. It is yet another example of the necessity of exploring and including all
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known behavior of the practical devices into the security analysis to guarantee the security
of practical QKD.
The next experiment is about the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial mode
detection efficiency mismatch attack. The experiment shows two main results. First, the
phase-only SLM and holograms generated by Zernike polynomials can be used to emulate
the atmospheric turbulence that covered typical strength at sea level up to the upper
atmosphere. Using that emulator, we show both the practical and theoretical limits of
Eve’s attack. The result implies that if Alice and Bob could establish a secure zone a
certain radius around their receiver where Eve could not present, although that zone does
not cover the whole quantum channel, that would prevent Eve from performing the attack
under study. Although the assumption of Eve’s limitation is not a common practice, this
study provides an insight into Eve’s capability and practical assumption on the security
claim that should be put on practical QKD. It also shows that a practical QKD can be
used today so long as such assumptions are acceptable for the risk.
The fifth experiment is another application of Zernike polynomials and phase-only SLM
to characterize a free-space QKD receiver. We first use the apparatus to narrow down the
number of Zernike polynomials terms that would affect the spatial mode detection efficiency
mismatch of the detector. We then use that result to characterize the receiver. With bet-
ter stability and more degree of freedom of the SLM, the experiment reveals exploitable
features that are obscured in the previous experiment. The result shows the necessity of
including higher-order Zernike polynomial terms to characterize the system against the
spatial mode attack. It also shows the insufficiency of the countermeasure proposed in
our previous study, and provide a test bench for an improved version of the countermea-
sure. This study shows the threat of setting a wrong parameter on a countermeasure.
It also shows the necessity of improving the characterization method and employs better
characterization apparatus as the tools become available.
The last experiment is the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor. We show
the ability of Eve to deterministically control the output result of a TES using a bright
laser. The result implies that the photon number result from TES alone, in contrast to
previously believes, cannot be used to characterize the quantum channel faithfully. It also
tells us that, before including in the system design, we should thoroughly characterize the
device and understand its behaviors both within the operational regime and beyond.
These studies have addressed some of the important issues in developing the QKD
standard and provided some possible solutions. I hope that this work will emphasize
the necessity of improving the system characterization procedure and the importance of
investigating physical side-channels in every implementation of QKD. Furthermore, I also
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believe that the iterations of finding vulnerabilities and testing countermeasures should
eventually lead us toward the high level of security promised by the theory of QKD.
88
References
[1] OEspace, https://www.eospace.com/polarization-controller, visited August
2020.
[2] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-2-submissions.
[3] Clavis2 specification sheet, http://www.idquantique.com/images/stories/PDF/
clavis2-quantum-key-distribution/clavis2-specs.pdf, visited 8 July 2016.
[4] OEspace, https://www.eospace.com/phase-modulator, visited August 2020.
[5] BME-Bergmann, https://www.bme-bergmann.de/high-voltage-electronics/
pockels-cell-driver-head/, visited August 2020.
[6] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Implementation security: protection against
Trojan horse attacks in one-way QKD systems, draft ETSI GS QKD
0010 V0.0.1 (2017-12), https://docbox.etsi.org/ISG/QKD/Open/GS_QKD_0010_
ISTrojan_Draft_0-0-1.pdf, visited 20 April 2019.
[7] SPCM-AQRH single photon counting module data sheet, http://www.excelitas.
com/Downloads/DTS_SPCM-AQRH.pdf, visited 13 March 2018.
[8] Photosensor modules H7422 series, https://www.hamamatsu.com/resources/pdf/
etd/m-h7422e.pdf, visited 13 March 2018.
[9] Arash Ahmadi. Towards On-demand Generation of Entangled Photons with Quantum
Dots. PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, 2019.
[10] N. Akil, S. E. Kerns, D. V. Kerns Jr., A. Hoffmann, and J-P. Charles. Photon
generation by silicon diodes in avalanche breakdown. Appl. Phys. Lett., 73:871–872,
1998.
89
[11] Scott A. Vanstone Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press, 5th edition, 2011.
[12] Larry C. Andrews and Ronald L. Phillips. Laser Beam Propagation through Random
Media. SPIE, 2nd edition, 2005.
[13] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and
coin tossing. In Proc. International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal
Processing (Bangalore, India), pages 175–179, New York, 1984. IEEE Press.
[14] Karl K. Berggren, Eric A. Dauler, Andrew J. Kerman, Sae-Woo Nam, and Danna
Rosenberg. Detectors based on superconductors. In Experimental Methods in the
Physical Sciences, volume 45, pages 185–216. Elsevier, 2013.
[15] J.-P. Bourgoin, E. Meyer-Scott, B. L. Higgins, B. Helou, C. Erven, H. Hübel, B. Ku-
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[109] M. Muller, S. Bounouar, K. D. Jöns, M. Glass, and P. Michler. On-demand generation
of indistinguishable polarization-entangled photon pairs. Nature Photon, 8:224–228,
2014.
[110] S. Nauerth, M. Fürst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter. Infor-
mation leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography. New J.
Phys., 11(6):065001, 2009.
[111] Sebastian Nauerth, Florian Moll, Markus Rau, Christian Fuchs, Joachim Horwath,
Stefan Frick, and Harald Weinfurter. Air-to-ground quantum communication. Nat.
Photonics, 7:382, 2013.
[112] Roger Newman. Visible light from a silicon p–n junction. Phys. Rev., 100:700–703,
1955.
[113] J. Noda, K. Okamoto, and Y. Sasaki. Polarization-maintaining fibers and their
applications. Journal of Lightwave Technology, 4(8):1071–1089, 1986.
[114] Robert J. Noll. Zernike polynomials and atmospheric turbulence. J. Opt. Soc. Am.,
66(3):207–211, 1976.
[115] National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST cryptographic standards and
guidelines development process (second draft). 2015.
[116] A. Pacelli, A. S. Spinelli, and A. L. Lacaita. Impact ionization in silicon: A micro-
scopic view. J. Appl. Phys., 83(9):4760–4764, 1998.
[117] James L. Park. The concept of transition in quantum mechanics. Foundations of
Physics, 1970.
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Codes for free-space detector
scanning
A.1 Matlab Code for Phase hologram generation
Here we show the MATLAB code for hologram phase mask generation. Adapted from
original code written by Katanya Kuntz.
% Code f o r hologram phase mask g e n e r a t i o n .
%Adapted from o r i g i n a l code w r i t t e n by Katanya kuntz .
function PhaseAngleAp = HoloGenHigherorder ( weight , theta , rho , Aperture )
% This s c r i p t g e n e r a t e s a s u p e r p o s i t i o n o f Zernike modes , each wi th a
% random w e i g h t i n g chosen from a c e r t a i n range
% ************************************
% ************ Parameters ************
% ************************************
% TIP = 0; % A d d i t i o n a l Z2 f o r s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f 0 & 1 s t orders
TIP = 60 ;
TILT = 40 ; % A d d i t i o n a l Z2 f o r s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f 0 & 1 s t orders
% TILT = 40; % A d d i t i o n a l Z3 f o r s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f 0 & 1 s t orders
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% Z 2 c o e f f = 1 ; % Keep/remove Z2 from hologram 0=remove , 1=keep
% Z 3 c o e f f = 1 ; % Keep/remove Z3 from hologram 0=remove , 1=keep
% % ***********************************************************************
% % *********************** Generate phase hologram ***********************
% % ***********************************************************************
%%only f i r s t 7 terms are used in our experiment .
Z2 = 2 .* rho .* cos ( theta ) ; % Tip n=1,m=1
Z3 = 2 .* rho .* sin ( theta ) ; % T i l t n=1,m==1
Z4 = sqrt ( 3 ) . * ( 2 . * ( rho .ˆ2) =1) ; % Defocus n=2,m=0
Z5 = sqrt ( 6 ) . * rho . ˆ 2 . * sin ( 2 .* theta ) ; % Obl ique ast igmat ism n=2,m==2
Z6 = sqrt ( 6 ) . * rho . ˆ 2 . * cos ( 2 .* theta ) ; % V e r t i c a l as t igmat ism n=2,m=2
Z7 = sqrt ( 8 ) . * ( 3 . * rho .ˆ3=2.* rho ) . * sin ( theta ) ; % V e r t i c a l coma n=3,m==1
% Z8 = s q r t ( 8 ) .* ( 3 .* rho .ˆ3=2.* rho ) .* cos ( t h e t a ) ; % H o r i z o n t a l coma n=3,m=1
% Z9 = s q r t ( 8 ) .* rho . ˆ 3 .* s i n ( 3 .* t h e t a ) ; % T r e f o i l n=3,m==3
% Z10 = s q r t ( 8 ) .* rho . ˆ 3 .* cos ( 3 .* t h e t a ) ; % T r e f o i l n=3,m=3
% Z11 = s q r t ( 5 ) .* ( 6 .* rho .ˆ4=6.* rho .ˆ2+1); % S p h e r i c a l n=4,m=0
% Z12 = s q r t ( 1 0 ) .* ( 4 .* rho .ˆ4=3.* rho . ˆ 2 ) .* cos ( 2 .* t h e t a ) ; % n=4,m=2
% Z13 = s q r t ( 1 0 ) .* ( 4 .* rho .ˆ4=3.* rho . ˆ 2 ) .* s i n ( 2 .* t h e t a ) ; % n=4,m==2
% Z14 = s q r t ( 1 0 ) .* rho . ˆ 4 .* cos ( 4 .* t h e t a ) ; % n=4,m=4
% Z15 = s q r t ( 1 0 ) .* rho . ˆ 4 .* s i n ( 4 .* t h e t a ) ; % n=4,m==4
% Z16 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* ( 1 0 .* rho .ˆ5=12.* rho .ˆ3+3.* rho ) .* cos ( t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m=1
% Z17 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* ( 1 0 .* rho .ˆ5=12.* rho .ˆ3+3.* rho ) .* s i n ( t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m==1
% Z18 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* ( 5 .* rho .ˆ5=4.* rho . ˆ 3 ) .* cos ( 3 .* t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m=3
% Z19 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* ( 5 .* rho .ˆ5=4.* rho . ˆ 3 ) .* s i n ( 3 .* t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m==3
% Z20 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* rho . ˆ 5 .* cos ( 5 .* t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m=5
% Z21 = s q r t ( 1 2 ) .* rho . ˆ 5 .* s i n ( 5 .* t h e t a ) ;
%n=5,m==5
PhaseMask = ( weight (2)+TIP ) . * Z2 + ( weight (3)+TILT ) . * Z3 +
weight ( 4 ) . * Z4 + weight ( 5 ) . * Z5 + weight ( 6 ) . * Z6 + weight ( 7 ) . * Z7 +
weight ( 1 4 ) .* Z14 ;
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PhaseAngleAp = ( angle (exp(1 i .*PhaseMask))+pi ) . * Aperture ;
A.2 Matlab Code for free-space detector scanning (tip-
tilt modes)
Here we show the MATLAB code for tip-tilt spatial mode scanning with turbulence emu-
lation phase mask.
%%%%%%%%%t i p= t i l t s p a t i a l mode scanning%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
clear ; close a l l ; clc ;
nTerms = 15 ; % number o f Zernike po lynomia l terms
weight = zeros (nTerms , 1 ) ;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Generate ’ turbu l ence=f r ee ’ phase hologram f o r a l ignment
% This hologram g e n e r a t i o n code i s adapted from the o r i g i n a l code
%wri ten by Katanya Kuntz
maxWeight = 25 ;
s t ep s = 20 ;
s t e p S i z e = maxWeight/ s t ep s ;
xrange = 2 ;
r = 1 ;
DiagHolo = 20e=2; % Diameter o f i n i t i a l beam [m]
% gridA = 40; % needs to be an even number ;
% g r i d w i l l be 2* gridA X 2* gridA
gridA = 800 ; % needs to be an even number ;
% g r i d w i l l be 2* gridA X 2* gridA
xa = DiagHolo /(2* gridA ) ; % spac ing between p i x e l s in INPUT g r i d
aa = =xa*gridA : xa : gridA*xa ; % l e n g t h o f input g r i d
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[C,D] = meshgrid ( aa , aa ) ; % input g r i d
l 1 = length (C) ;
xx = =1*xrange : ( ( 2 * xrange )/ ( l1 =1)) : xrange ;
[X,Y] = meshgrid ( xx , xx ) ;
[ theta , rho ] = cart2pol (X,Y) ; % This makes t h e t a [=pi , p i ]
% ******************************************************
% ************ Generate a c i r c u l a r aper ture ************
% ******************************************************
x = length ( rho ) ;
for k=1:x
for j =1:x
i f rho (k , j ) <= r
Aperture (k , j ) = 1 ;
else





PhaseAngleAp = HoloGen ( weight , theta , rho , Aperture ) ;
pos = [350 800 1243 1 2 0 0 ] ;
f igure ( 1 ) ;
%f i g u r e (FigNum ) ;
pcolor ( PhaseAngleAp ) , shading i n t e r p
colormap gray
set (gca , ’ v i s i b l e ’ , ’ o f f ’ ) ;
set ( gcf , ’ Color ’ , ’ b lack ’ ) ;
set (0 , ’ De fau l tF igu r ePos i t i on ’ , pos ) ;
t i t l e ( ’ Phase hologram ’ )
% saveas ( gc f , ’ TurbCoeffs /20160725/D=20cm, r0=7cm 20160725T . png ’ ) ;
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% weigh t (2) = 2;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%55
%Begin scanning
% connect to counters
% f c l o s e ( i n s t r f i n d ) ;
h APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM5’ ) ;
v APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM6’ ) ;
d APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM4’ ) ;
a APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM7’ ) ;
fopen (h APD ) ;
fopen (v APD ) ;
fopen (d APD ) ;
fopen (a APD ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
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fpr intf (d APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
pause ( 5 ) ; % wait f o r connect ion and a d a p t i v e p a r t s to be
% s t a b e l i z e d u s e f u l f o r mechanical scanning
p = x l s r e ad ( ’ APDcor rec t i on po ly8 f i t . x l sx ’ ) ;
maxMismatchH = 1 ;
maxMismatchV = 1 ;
maxMismatchD = 1 ;
maxMismatchA = 1 ;
count = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
paulo = measure APD (h APD, v APD, d APD, a APD ) ;
det10 = paulo ( 1 ) ;
det20 = paulo ( 2 ) ;
det30 = paulo ( 3 ) ;
det40 = paulo ( 4 ) ;
%det4 ( row , c o l )
det30 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det30 , p ( 2 , : ) )
det40 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det40 , p ( 4 , : ) )
det10 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det10 , p ( 3 , : ) )
det20 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det20 , p ( 1 , : ) )
row = 1 ;
c o l = 1 ;
for yPos = =maxWeight : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
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weight (2 ) = yPos ;
for zPos = =maxWeight : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
weight (3 ) = zPos ;
PhaseAngleAp = HoloGen ( weight , theta , rho , Aperture ) ;
pause ( 1 ) ;
paulo = measure APD (h APD, v APD, d APD, a APD ) ;
det1 ( row , c o l ) = paulo ( 1 ) ;
det2 ( row , c o l ) = paulo ( 2 ) ;
%det2 ( row , c o l )
det3 ( row , c o l ) = paulo ( 3 ) ;
%det3 ( row , c o l )
det4 ( row , c o l ) = paulo ( 4 ) ;
%det4 ( row , c o l )
det3c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det3 ( row , c o l ) , p ( 2 , : ) ) / det10 ;
det4c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det4 ( row , c o l ) , p ( 4 , : ) ) / det20 ;
det1c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det1 ( row , c o l ) , p ( 3 , : ) ) / det30 ;
det2c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det2 ( row , c o l ) , p ( 1 , : ) ) / det40 ;
mismatchH = det1c /max( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchH > maxMismatchH
count (1 ) = count (1)+1;
maxMismatchH = mismatchH
maxMismatchHtmp( count ( 1 ) ) = mismatchH ;
OptWeightHtmp( count ( 1 ) , : ) = weight ;
end
mismatchV = det2c /max( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchV > maxMismatchV
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count (2 ) = count (2)+1;
maxMismatchV = mismatchV
maxMismatchVtmp( count ( 2 ) ) = mismatchV ;
OptWeightVtmp( count ( 2 ) , : ) = weight ;
end
mismatchD = det3c /max( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchD > maxMismatchD
count (3 ) = count (3)+1;
maxMismatchD = mismatchD
maxMismatchDtmp( count ( 3 ) ) = mismatchD ;
OptWeightDtmp( count ( 3 ) , : ) = weight ;
end
mismatchA = det4c /max( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchA > maxMismatchA
count (4 ) = count (4)+1;
maxMismatchA = mismatchA
maxMismatchAtmp( count ( 4 ) ) = mismatchA ;
OptWeightAtmp( count ( 4 ) , : ) = weight ;
end
figure ( 1 ) ;
pcolor ( PhaseAngleAp ) , shading i n t e r p
row = row+1;
end
row = 1 ;
c o l = c o l+1
end
disp ( ’ Scan f i n i s h e d ’ )
%%save data%%%%%%%
p = 0 ;
path = ’2018=05=15=ScanSLM=BG430=620=830=550= f ixedSLMsetup ’ ;
f i l ename = [ path ’ . x l sx ’ ] ;
x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , squeeze ( det1 ( : , : ) ) , ’ Sheet1 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
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x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , squeeze ( det2 ( : , : ) ) , ’ Sheet2 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , squeeze ( det3 ( : , : ) ) , ’ Sheet3 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , squeeze ( det4 ( : , : ) ) , ’ Sheet4 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
disp ( ’ f i l e saved ’ )
%
A.3 Matlab Code for free-space detector scanning (Higher-
order)
%%%%%%%%Higher o f d e r scanning%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
clear ; close a l l ; clc ;
nTerms = 7 ; % number o f Zernike po lynomia l terms
weight = zeros (nTerms , 1 ) ;
p = x l s r e ad ( ’ APDcor rec t i on po ly8 f i t . x l sx ’ ) ;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%5
%Generate ’ turbu l ence=f r ee ’ phase hologram f o r a l ignment and r e f e r e n c e
% This hologram g e n e r a t i o n / p r o j e c t i o n code i s adapted from the o r i g i n a l
% code wr i ten by Katanya Kuntz
maxWeight = 8 ; %due to hardware l i m i t a t i o n . Higher we igh t f o r h i g h e r order terms w i l l cause d i s t o r t i o n
s t ep s = 4 ;
s t e p S i z e = maxWeight/ s t ep s ;
xrange = 2 ;
r = 1 ;
DiagHolo = 20e=2; % Diameter o f i n i t i a l beam [m]
% gridA = 40; % needs to be an even number ;
% g r i d w i l l be 2* gridA X 2* gridA
gridA = 800 ; % needs to be an even number ;
% g r i d w i l l be 2* gridA X 2* gridA
xa = DiagHolo /(2* gridA ) ; % spac ing between p i x e l s in INPUT g r i d
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aa = =xa*gridA : xa : gridA*xa ; % l e n g t h o f input g r i d
[C,D] = meshgrid ( aa , aa ) ; % input g r i d
l 1 = length (C) ;
xx = =1*xrange : ( ( 2 * xrange )/ ( l1 =1)) : xrange ;
[X,Y] = meshgrid ( xx , xx ) ;
[ theta , rho ] = cart2pol (X,Y) ; % This makes t h e t a [=pi , p i ]
% ******************************************************
% ************ Generate a c i r c u l a r aper ture ************
% ******************************************************
x = length ( rho ) ;
for k=1:x
for j =1:x
i f rho (k , j ) <= r
Aperture (k , j ) = 1 ;
else





weight (2 ) = 2 . 5 ;
weight (3 ) = 8 . 7 5 ;
PhaseAngleAp = HoloGenHigherorder ( weight , theta , rho , Aperture ) ;
pos = [350 800 1243 1 2 0 0 ] ;
f igure ( 1 ) ;
%f i g u r e (FigNum ) ;
pcolor ( PhaseAngleAp ) , shading i n t e r p
colormap gray
set (gca , ’ v i s i b l e ’ , ’ o f f ’ ) ;
set ( gcf , ’ Color ’ , ’ b lack ’ ) ;
set (0 , ’ De fau l tF igu r ePos i t i on ’ , pos ) ;
t i t l e ( ’ Phase hologram ’ )
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%end hologram g e n e r a t i o n
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%55
% connect to counters
% f c l o s e ( i n s t r f i n d ) ;
h APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM5’ ) ;
v APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM6’ ) ;
d APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM4’ ) ;
a APD = s e r i a l ( ’COM7’ ) ;
fopen (h APD ) ;
fopen (v APD ) ;
fopen (d APD ) ;
fopen (a APD ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’SRCE0 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (h APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (v APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’MODE6’ ) ;
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fpr intf (d APD, ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (d APD, ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’MODE6’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’GATE1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’LEVL1, 1 . 4 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’TERM1, 1 ’ ) ;
fpr intf (a APD , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
disp ( ’ I n i t i a t e scanning : Run ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ’ )
pause ( 1 0 ) ;
row = 1 ;
c o l = 1 ;
% weigh t (2) = 1 2 . 5 ;
% weigh t (3) = 5;
maxMismatchH = 1 ;
maxMismatchV = 1 ;
maxMismatchD = 1 ;
maxMismatchA = 1 ;
count = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
maxMismatchH2 = 1 ;
maxMismatchV2 = 1 ;
maxMismatchD2 = 1 ;
maxMismatchA2 = 1 ;
count2 = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
paulo = measure APD (h APD, v APD, d APD, a APD ) ;
det10 = paulo ( 1 ) ;
det20 = paulo ( 2 ) ;
det30 = paulo ( 3 ) ;
det40 = paulo ( 4 ) ;
det30 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det30 , p ( 2 , : ) )
det40 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det40 , p ( 4 , : ) )
det10 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det10 , p ( 3 , : ) )
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det20 = c o r r e c t i o n ( det20 , p ( 1 , : ) )
for i 7 = =maxWeight=s t e p S i z e : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
weight (7 ) = i 7 ;
i 7
for i 6 = =maxWeight=s t e p S i z e : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
weight (6 ) = i 6 ;
i 6
for i 5 = =maxWeight=s t e p S i z e : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
weight (5 ) = i 5 ;
i 5
for i 4 = =maxWeight : s t e p S i z e : maxWeight
weight (4 ) = i 4 ;
f igure ( 1 ) ;
pcolor ( PhaseAngleAp ) , shading i n t e r p %d i s p l a y
PhaseAngleAp = HoloGenHigherorder ( weight , theta , rho , Aperture ) ;
%Calc , i n t e n t e n t i o n a l l y swap Calc / Disp lay g i v e ’ pause ’
%time w h i l e c a l c u r a t e next hologram .
pause ( 3 ) ;
paulo = measure APD (h APD, v APD, d APD, a APD ) ; %readout
det1 = paulo ( 1 ) ;
det2 = paulo ( 2 ) ;
det3 = paulo ( 3 ) ;
det4 = paulo ( 4 ) ;
%c o r r e c t i n g counts
det3c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det3 , p ( 2 , : ) ) / det10 ;
det4c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det4 , p ( 4 , : ) ) / det20 ;
det1c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det1 , p ( 3 , : ) ) / det30 ;
det2c = c o r r e c t i o n 2 o r d e r ( det2 , p ( 1 , : ) ) / det40 ;
%record combinat ions t h a t cause min and max mismatch
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%============================Minmismatch=======================
mismatchH = det1c /max( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchH > maxMismatchH
count (1 ) = count (1)+1;
maxMismatchH = mismatchH
maxMismatchHtmp( count ( 1 ) ) = mismatchH ;
w = weight
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightHtmp( count ( 1 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchV = det2c /max( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchV > maxMismatchV
count (2 ) = count (2)+1;
maxMismatchV = mismatchV
maxMismatchVtmp( count ( 2 ) ) = mismatchV ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightVtmp( count ( 2 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchD = det3c /max( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchD > maxMismatchD
count (3 ) = count (3)+1;
maxMismatchD = mismatchD
maxMismatchDtmp( count ( 3 ) ) = mismatchD ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightDtmp( count ( 3 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchA = det4c /max( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchA > maxMismatchA
count (4 ) = count (4)+1;
maxMismatchA = mismatchA
maxMismatchAtmp( count ( 4 ) ) = mismatchA ;
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w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightAtmp( count ( 4 ) , : ) = w;
end
%============================Maxmismatch=======================
mismatchH2 = det1c /min( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchH2 > maxMismatchH2
count2 (1 ) = count2 (1)+1;
maxMismatchH2 = mismatchH2
maxMismatchHtmp2( count ( 1 ) ) = mismatchH2 ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightHtmp2( count ( 1 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchV2 = det2c /min( det3c , det4c ) ;
i f mismatchV2 > maxMismatchV2
count (2 ) = count (2)+1;
maxMismatchV2 = mismatchV2
maxMismatchVtmp2( count ( 2 ) ) = mismatchV2 ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightVtmp2( count ( 2 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchD2 = det3c /min( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchD2 > maxMismatchD2
count (3 ) = count (3)+1;
maxMismatchD2 = mismatchD2
maxMismatchDtmp2( count ( 3 ) ) = mismatchD2 ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;
OptWeightDtmp2( count ( 3 ) , : ) = w;
end
mismatchA2 = det4c /min( det1c , det2c ) ;
i f mismatchA2 > maxMismatchA2
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count2 (4 ) = count2 (4)+1;
maxMismatchA2 = mismatchA2
maxMismatchAtmp2( count ( 4 ) ) = mismatchA2 ;
w = weight ;
w(4) = weight (4)= s t e p S i z e ;






disp ( ’ Scan f i n i s h e d ’ )
c = clock ;
disp (num2str( c ) )
122
Appendix B
Codes for Quantum dot QKD
experiment
Here we show the Python code for coincidence search and histogram plotting
B.1 Python code for coincidence detection plot
# This code i s used f i n d the c o i n c i d e n c e s between two d e t e c t o r s
from s c ipy . opt imize import c u r v e f i t
from pandas import *
import matp lo t l i b . pyplot as p l t
import numpy as np
#=======================================================
#====Import ’ c o i n c i u d e n t ’ c l i c k s between two d e t e c t o r s
f = open( ”G280 . txt ” , ” r ” )
i f f . mode == ’ r ’ :
print ( ’ f i l e opened ’ )
data = np . genfromtxt ( f )
f . c l o s e ( )
# beg in c o i n c i d e n t f i n d i n g
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time = [ ]#np . ones ( ( l e n ( data ) ,3) )*2 e=9
time3 = [ ]
time4 = [ ]
time5 = [ ]
time6 = [ ]
t i c = [ 0 ]
co inc = [ ]
channel = np . z e r o s (30)
j = 0
en = len ( data )=2600000;
for i in range (1000 , en ) :
# The two t i m e t a g g e r p o r t s used are por t 4 and 6 .
t i c . append ( data [ i , 1 ] )
i f int ( data [ i ,0 ] )==4:
time4 . append ( data [ i , : ] )
for k in range ( 1 , 2 0 ) :
i f ( data [ i+k ,0 ]==6):
co inc . append ( ( data [ i+k ,1]= data [ i , 1 ] )*0 .000000000078125)
j+=1
i f ( data [ i=k ,0 ]==6):
co inc . append ( ( data [ i=k ,1]= data [ i , 1 ] )*0 .000000000078125)
j+=1
####end coinc f i n d i n g===========
#SPlot his togram . The p l o t i s used to f i n d the s h i f t o f
#’0 ’ peak ( e l e c t r o n i c d e l a y ) . This d e l a y and p o s i t i o n o f
#s i d e peaks are used in the f o l l o w i n g g2 f i t t i n g and c a l c u l a t i o n .
f i g= p l t . f i g u r e ( f i g s i z e =(6 ,3))
p l t . h i s t ( co inc , b ins =100 , range = (=50e=9 ,50e=9))
p l t . t i t l e ( ” c o i n c i d e n c e s ” )
p l t . s a v e f i g ( ’ co inc idence44 . pdf ’ )
p l t . show ( )
Here is the Python code for coincidence histogram fitting. The fitting is used for noise
subtraction. This code is adapted from the original code written by Arash Ahmadi.
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#====c o i n c i d e n c e f i n d e r===comment t h e s e a f t e r g e t ’ co inc ’ data
f = open( ”G280 . txt ” , ” r ” )
i f f . mode == ’ r ’ :
print ( ’ f i l e opened ’ )
data = np . genfromtxt ( f )
f . c l o s e ( )
## beg in f i t t i n g
df1 = [ ]
t0 = 6 .4 e=9 #time s h i f t to c e n t e r the p l o t ,
#e s t i m a t e from ’ c o i n c i d e n t p l o t ’ above
decimation=1
dt =0.0781e=9 #r e s o l u t i o n o f the time t a g g e r
HFONT = { ’ fontname ’ : ’ Times ’}
df1 [ : ] = [ x=t0 for x in co inc ] #c e n t e r i n g the data to t=0
b in s s = 240
hdf , b in edge s = np . histogram ( df1 , b ins=binss , range
= (=b in s s /4*1e=9, b in s s /4*1e=9))
#choos ing the c e n t e r p o i n t s o f the two s i d e peaks to
#analyze , e s t i m a t e from the c o i n c i d e n t p l o t
cpp = 0 #c e n t e r
cp1 = 12.88 e=9 #s i d e 1
cp2 = 12.88 e=9*2 #s i d e 2
w= 5e=9 #width o f each peak . . +/= w=ns from the c e n t e r p o i n t
p l t . p l o t ( b in edge s [ : =1 ] , hdf ) #p l o t t i n g the whole data
#F i t t i n g
#SidePeak 1
sp1 = hdf [ int ( b in s s /2+(cp1=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cp1+w)*2 e9 ) ]
edge1 = b in edge s [ int ( b in s s /2+(cp1=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cp1+w)*2 e9 ) ]
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#SidePeak 2
sp2=hdf [ int ( b in s s /2+(cp2=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cp2+w)*2 e9 ) ]
edge2 = b in edge s [ int ( b in s s /2+(cp2=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cp2+w)*2 e9 ) ]
#Center=== or Centre . . . what ever the l o c a l s says . . .
cp = hdf [ int ( b in s s /2+(cpp=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cpp+w)*2 e9 ) ]
edgecp = b in edge s [ int ( b in s s /2+(cpp=w)*2 e9 ) : int ( b in s s /2+(cpp+w)*2 e9 ) ]
###d e f i n e h y p e r b o l i c d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n
#h t t p s :// en . w i k i p e d i a . org / w i k i / H y p e r b o l i c d i s t r i b u t i o n
#Only bi=e s p o n e n t i a l term i s needed here
def b i exp i (x , *p ) :
A1 , A2 , mu, tau1 , tau2 = p
return A1*np . exp(=np . abs (x=mu)/ tau1 )
#p l o t t i n g the two s i d e peaks
p l t . p l o t ( edge1 , sp1 , ’ r ’ )
p l t . p l o t ( edge2 , sp2 , ’ g ’ )
#f i t t i n g the two s i d e peaks wi th bi=e x p o n e n t i a l f u n c t i o n
#. . . beware o f p0 range o f parameter
c o e f f , var matr ix = c u r v e f i t ( b iexp i , edge1 , sp1 , \
p0 =[1000 . , 50 , cp1 , 1e=9 ,20e=9 ] )
c o e f f 2 , var matr ix2 = c u r v e f i t ( b iexp i , edge2 , sp2 , \
p0 =[1000 . , 50 , cp2 , 1e=9 ,20e=9 ] )
c o e f f c , var matr ixc = c u r v e f i t ( b iexp i , edgecp , cp , \
p0 =[100 . , 10 , 0 , 1e=9 ,20e=9 ] )
# Get the f i t t e d curve
dt = np . l i n s p a c e (=b in s s /4*1e=9, b in s s /4*1e=9, b in s s )
p u l s e f i t = b i exp i ( dt , * c o e f f )
p u l s e f i t 2 = b i exp i ( dt ,* c o e f f 2 )
p u l s e f i t c p = b i exp i ( dt ,* c o e f f c )
p l t . p l o t ( dt , p u l s e f i t )
p l t . p l o t ( dt , p u l s e f i t 2 )
p l t . p l o t ( dt , p u l s e f i t c p )
p l t . p l o t ( dt , p u l s e f i t+p u l s e f i t 2 )
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#p l t . p l o t ( dt , p u l s e f i t c p =( p u l s e f i t+p u l s e f i t 2 ) , ’ k ’ )
p l t . s a v e f i g ( ’ g 2 f i t 2 . pdf ’ )
#p l t . x l im ((100 ,125))
p l t . show ( )
The noise level is determined from the fitting. After noise subtraction, the value of g2
can then be calculated from the height of center peak divided by the avarage height of side
peaks.
B.2 Matlab code for key rate calculation
Here is the MATLAB code for key length calculation for Quantum dot QKD experiment
# Pract i ca key lengtyh c a l c u l a t i o n for QDot and WCP QKD
clc ;
clear a l l ;
RepDec = 80 e6 ; %r e p i t i t i o n r a t e decoy
rep1 = 2.6*1 e6 ; %r e p e t i t i o n r a t e QD
f l i g h t t i m e = 100 ; %key exchange time in second
e f f d = 1 ; %c o u p l i n g e f f decoy
e f f = . 5 ; %c o u p l i n g e f f i c i e n c y qdot
q=1/2; %s i f t i n g f a c t o r
l o s s c o r r = 1 ; %l o s s c o r r e c t i o n term ( lambda mismatch o f a t t e n u a t o r )
RepDec = RepDec* f l i g h t t i m e ;
rep1 = rep1 * f l i g h t t i m e ;
N = RepDec ; %%pos t p r o c e s s i n g Block s i z e
e p s i l o n f = 1e=9; %e p s i l o n f o r f i n i t e s i z e
theta Bob = 0 . 5 ; %Bob ’ s d e t e c t o n e f f
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f e =1.3 ; %error c o r r e c t i o n e f f
e0 =1/2; %f r a c t i o n o f er ror from background count
e d e t e c t o r = 5*10ˆ(=2); %system error
dc = 500 ; %dark count per second per d e t e c t i o n b a s i s
background noise = 300 ;




v =0.1 ; %nu
Y0=dc pd ; %background count per d e t e c t i o n
l =1:Len ;
x=l . / 1 0 ;
t AB = 10.ˆ(=x . / 1 0 ) ;
theta= t AB .* theta Bob ;
Qu1=Y0+1=exp(= theta *u ) ;
Qv1=Y0+1=exp(= theta *v ) ;
Eu=(e0*Y0+e d e t e c t o r *(1=exp(= theta *u ) ) ) . / Qu1 ;
Ev=(e0*Y0+e d e t e c t o r *(1=exp(= theta *v ) ) ) . / Qv1 ;
Y1=u/(u*v=v ˆ2)* (Qv1*exp( v)=Qu1*exp(u)*vˆ2/uˆ2=(uˆ2=vˆ2)*Y0/(u ˆ 2 ) ) ;
A = u . / ( v . * ( u=v ) ) . *Qv1.*(1=2.*Ev ) . * exp( v)=v . / ( u .*
(u=v ) ) . *Qu1.*(1=2.*Eu ) . * exp(u ) ;
B = min( (Ev .*Qv1 .*exp( v ) ) . / v , ( Eu .*Qu1 .*exp(u)=Ev .*
Qv1 .*exp( v ) ) . / ( u=v ) ) ;
c1 = u/( v*(u=v ) )*exp( v ) ;
c2 = v /(u*(u=v ) )*exp(u ) ;
HE= =Eu.* log2 (Eu)=(1=Eu ) . * log2(1=Eu ) ;
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Q1= uˆ2*exp(=u )/( u*v=v ˆ2)* (Qv1*exp( v)=Qu1*exp(u)*
vˆ2/uˆ2=(uˆ2=vˆ2)*Y0/u ˆ 2 ) ;
%e= (Ev .*Qv1 .* exp ( v)=e0*Y0) . /Y1*v ;
%Q1=Y1*u*exp(=u ) ;
e= (Eu .*Qu1 .*exp(u ) ) . / Y1*v .* x /5 ;
He==e .* log2 ( e)=(1=e ) . * log2(1=e ) ;
R2 = q*(=Qu1 .* f e .*HE+Q1.*(1=He ) ) ; %key r a t e i n f
%%f i n i t e s i z e c o r r e c t i o n term f o r decoy
%%c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , Curty e t . a l.%%%
N2=Q1*RepDec* e f f d ;
ua = 10 ; %ua=Sigma w i t h i n c e n t r a l e s t i m a t i o n
Nu = .9*N2 ;
Nv = .1*N2 ;
deltaQu1 = ua*sqrt (Qu1/Nu ) ;
deltaQv1 = ua*sqrt (Qv1/Nv ) ;
Qu1=Qu1+deltaQu1 ;
Qv1=Qv1+deltaQv1 ;
Eu=(e0*Y0+e d e t e c t o r *(1=exp(= theta *u ) ) ) . / Qu1 ;
Ev=(e0*Y0+e d e t e c t o r *(1=exp(= theta *v ) ) ) . / Qv1 ;
deltaEuQu = ua .* sqrt ( 2 .*Eu.*Qu1 . /Nu ) ;
deltaEvQv = ua .* sqrt ( 2 .*Ev .*Qv1 . /Nv ) ;
deltaA = sqrt ( ( c1 .* deltaQv1 ) .ˆ2+4 .* ( c1 .* deltaEvQv ).ˆ2+
( c2 .* deltaQu1 ) .ˆ2+4 .* ( c2 .* deltaEuQu ) . ˆ 2 ) ;
deltaB = zeros (1 , s ize (A, 2 ) ) ;
for k = 1 : s ize (A, 2 )
deltaB ( k ) = min(exp(u)* deltaEuQu ( k )/u , exp( v )* deltaEvQv ( k )/ v ) ;
deltaB ( k ) = min( sqrt ( ( ( exp(u)* deltaEuQu ( k))ˆ2+(exp( v )*
deltaEvQv ( k ) ) ˆ 2 ) / ( u=v ) ) , deltaB ( k ) ) ;
end
deltaY1 = sqrt ( ( deltaA .* log2 ( ( 2 . *A+2.*B) . / (A+2.*B)) ) . ˆ2+( deltaB .*
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( ( 4 . *B. * (A+B) ) . / (A+2.*B) . ˆ 2 ) ) . ˆ 2 ) /Nu;
Y1 = Y1=deltaY1 ;
e= (Eu .*Qu1 .*exp(u ) ) . / Y1*v ;
He==e .* log2 ( e)=(1=e ) . * log2(1=e ) ;
R1 = q*(=Qu1 .* f e .*HE+Q1.*((1=He)))=(7* sqrt (N2 .* log2 (2/ e p s i l o n f ) ) .
/N2+2*log2 (1/2/( e p s i l o n f ) ) ) . / N2 ;
R1 = R1.*N2 ;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%QDot%%%%%%%%%%
p tag = 0 . 0 0 0 1 ; %mult iphoton p r o b a b i l i t y from Quantum dot
AA = ( theta * e f f=p tag ) . / theta * e f f ;
N3 = rep1 .* theta ;
E = ( e d e t e c t o r+e0 *(Y0 ) ) ;
Ea = E. /AA;
H= =E.* log2 (E)=(1=E) . * log2(1=E) ;
Ha = =Ea .* log2 (Ea)=(1=Ea ) . * log2(1=Ea ) ;
Rinf = AA.* q . * ( e f f * theta .*(1=Ha)=( e f f * theta+Y0 ) . * f e *H) ;
Rsin = Rinf=(7*sqrt (N3 .* log2 (2/ e p s i l o n f ) ) . / N3+2*
log2 (1/2/( e p s i l o n f ) ) ) . / N3 ;
R5 = Rsin .*N3 ; %s e c r e t key l e n g t h
th = 10000 ;
%%%%%%p l o t s%%%%%%%%%%
semilogy (x , R1 , ’ r ’ )
hold on ;
semilogy (x , R5 , ’ g ’ )
xlabel ( ’ Loss (dB) ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ l a t e x ’ ) ;
ylabel ( ’ Se c r e t key l ength per s a t t e l l i t e pass ’ ,
’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ l a t e x ’ ) ;
yl im ( [ 1 e1 , 1 e8 ] ) ;
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